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Analyse comparée de la formation et des effets des régimes institutionnels de 
ressources naturelles en Suisse 
Partant du constat de l'accroissement significatif et généralisé de la consommation des res-
sources naturelles, le projet a pour ambition d'examiner, dans le cas de la Suisse, quels sont 
les types de régimes institutionnels -régimes composés de l'ensemble des droits de propriété 
de disposition et d'usages s'appliquant aux différentes ressources naturelles, de même que des 
politiques publiques d'exploitation et de protection les régulant- susceptibles de prévenir des 
processus de surexploitation et de dégradation de ces ressources. 
Dans le cadre de ce projet de recherche financé par le Fonds national suisse de la recherche 
scientifique (FNRS), il s'agit, dans un premier temps, d'analyser les trajectoires historiques 
d'adaptation et de changements des régimes institutionnels des différentes ressources sur une 
durée d'environ un siècle (1900-2000). C'est l'objet des différents screenings. 
Dans un second temps et à l'aide d'études de cas, ces transformations de (ou au sein des) ré-
gimes institutionnels sont analysées sous l'angle de leurs effets sur l'état de la ressource. 
L'ambition finale de cette recherche est de comprendre les conditions d'émergence de "régi-
mes intégrés" capables de prendre en compte un nombre croissant de groupes d'usagers agis-
sant à différents niveaux (géographiques et institutionnels) et ayant des usages de plus en plus 
hétérogènes et concurrents de ces différentes ressources. 
Le champ empirique de la recherche porte plus particulièrement sur cinq ressources que sont: 
l'eau, l'air, le sol, le paysage et la forêt. 
 
Vergleichende Analyse der Genese und Auswirkungen institutioneller Res-
sourcenregime in der Schweiz 
Ausgehend von der Feststellung, dass die Konsumraten natürlicher Ressourcen weltweit stetig 
steigen, untersucht das Projekt, ob und welche institutionellen Regime in der Schweiz einer 
Übernutzung und Degradation von solchen Ressourcen entgegenwirken. Solche Regime be-
stehen aus der eigentumsrechtlichen Grundordnung (Eigentumstitel, Verfügungs- und Nut-
zungsrechte) und der Gesamtheit der ressourcenspezifischen öffentlichen Nutzungs- und 
Schutzpolitiken. 
In einem ersten Schritt zeichnen wir nach, wie sich die institutionellen Regime verschiedener 
Ressourcen über eine Dauer von ungefähr hundert Jahren (1900-2000) angepasst und entwi-
ckelt haben. Diese überblicksartigen historischen Analysen bilden den Inhalt der verschiede-
nen Screenings. 
In einem zweiten Schritt werden mittels Fallstudien die Wirkungen von Veränderungen eines 
institutionellen Regimes auf den Zustand der Ressource evaluiert. 
Mit dem Projekt soll das Verständnis dafür erhöht werden, unter welchen Bedingungen „in-
tegrierte Regime“ entstehen können: Wie kann es zu institutionellen Regimen kommen, wel-
che die zunehmend heterogenen und konkurrenzierenden Nutzungen einer steigenden Anzahl 
von Nutzergruppen aus verschiedenen geographischen und institutionellen Ebenen berück-
sichtigen? 
Als empirische Beispiele stehen in diesem vom Schweizerischen Nationalfonds zur Förderung 
der wissenschaftlichen Forschung (SNF) finanzierten Projekt die fünf natürlichen Ressourcen 
Wasser, Luft, Boden, Landschaft und Wald im Zentrum. 
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Comparative analysis of the formation and outcomes of resource regimes in 
Switzerland 
In the context of a significant and widespread increase in the consumption of natural re-
sources, the aim of this project is to determine, in the case of Switzerland, which type of insti-
tutional regime (the property and uses rights pertaining to the different natural resources as 
well as the public policies regulating their exploitation and protection) would most effectively 
prevent the overexploitation and degradation of these resources. 
In the first stage of this project, financed by the Swiss National Science Foundation, we will 
analyse how previous institutional regimes evolved over a period of one hundred years (1900-
2000). Several screenings will be devoted to this issue. 
The next stage of our research will be devoted to the analysis, based on several case studies, 
of these modifications from the point of view of their impact on the state of a given natural 
resource. 
The final aim of this research project is to understand the conditions necessary for the elabora-
tion of an "integrated regime" which would take into account the growing number of users at 
various levels (both geographical and institutional), as well as the increasingly varied and 
competing forms of consumption of these resources. 
This study will focus on five main resources: water, air, soil, landscape and forests. 
 EINLEITUNG* 
Im Rahmen der dritten Phase der eingangs vorgestellten Studie "Vergleichende Analyse der 
Genese und Auswirkungen institutioneller Ressourcenregime" wurden im achtköpfigen For-
schungsteam1 insgesamt zehn Fallstudien zu Veränderungen regionaler Ressourcenregime in 
den Bereichen Wasser, Boden und Wald erstellt (zwischen August 2000 und März 2002) 2. 
Sie bilden die Grundlage für die zweite Projektpublikation zu institutionellen Regimen natür-
licher Ressourcen, die im Rahmen eines Nationalfonds-Projektes (Nr. 1214-55890-98/1, Sep-
tember 1999 bis August 2002) entstand3. Die Fallstudien sollten Antwort geben auf die drei 
folgenden Forschungsfragen.  
 
Gemeinsame Forschungsfragen 
1. Wie entstehen bzw. verändern sich institutionelle Regime natürlicher Ressourcen in Raum 
und Zeit und welches ist der Auslöser solcher Veränderungen auf lokaler bzw. regionaler 
Ebene? Unter welchen Bedingungen sind welche ihrer konstitutiven Elemente (z.B. Nut-
zungsrechte, Zielgruppen, Politikinstrumente) am stärksten von solchen Veränderungen 
betroffen? Welchen Anteil haben Veränderungen der eigentumsrechtlichen Grundordnung 
und Veränderungen öffentlicher Schutz- und Nutzungspolitiken an der Lösung welcher 
typischer Ressourcenprobleme? 
Die empirischen Fallstudien sollten Hinweise darauf geben, wie sich Veränderungen der 
eigentumsrechtlichen Grundordnung und der öffentlichen Schutz- und Nutzungspolitiken 
auf die beiden nach dem IR-Konzept massgeblichen Regimedimensionen "Ausmass" und 
"Kohärenz" und auf die effektive Ressourcenutzung und derer Nachhaltigkeit auswirken. 
2. Welchen Erklärungsgehalt haben die in den historischen Screenings analysierten (letztma-
ligen) Veränderungen der nationalen Determinanten institutioneller Ressourcenregime für 
die beobachtbaren Veränderungen auf lokaler Ebene? Gibt es spezifische kantonale und 
regionale Regimedynamiken, die sich nicht durch Entwicklungen der nationalen IR-
Determinanten erklären lassen? 
Diese Frage liegt auf der Linie der klassischen Vollzugsforschung, die aufgezeigt hat, dass 
nicht zu erwarten ist, dass nationale Politikänderungen auf lokaler Ebene gewissermassen 
mechanisch "vollzogen" würden. Denkbar sind vielmehr auch Situationen, in denen regio-
nale Bewegungen solchen auf nationaler Ebene vorgehen oder völlig anders verlaufen, als 
es die nationalen Politikvorgaben verlangen. Denkbar ist ausserdem, dass die in der klassi-
schen Politikanalyse weitgehend unberücksichtigten Eigentumsstrukturen wichtige Ver-
änderungen erfahren haben, die keine explizite Grundlage in den nationalen Determinan-
ten der IR haben. 
3. Wie wirken sich Regimeveränderungen auf das Verhalten der Ressourcennutzer und auf 
den Ressourcenzustand aus?  
                                                 
*  Teilweise Textausschnitte aus den Kapiteln 1 und 2 des zweiten Buches (Knoepfel et al. 2003). 
1  Peter Knoepfel, Ingrid Kissling-Näf, Frédéric Varone, Kurt Bisang, Corine Mauch, Stéphane Nahrath, Em-
manuel Reynard, Adèle Thorens. 
2  Das sind je drei Studien zum Boden und zum Wald sowie vier zum Wasser (von den Wasserstudien sind 
zwei auch Bestandteile der international vergleichenden EU-Studie Euwareness (www.Euwareness.nl) abge-
schlossen Ende Februar 2002). 
3  Vgl. zur Publikationsliste: www.idheap.ch (UER politiques publiques/environnement-publications IRM). 
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Im Besonderen fragen wir, inwiefern eine Ausweitung der Zahl der explizit regulierten 
Güter und Dienstleistungen bezogen auf die Gesamtheit der tatsächlichen Ressourcennut-
zungen (Erweiterung des absoluten und relativen Ausmasses) nachhaltigere 
Nutzungspraktiken bewirkt. Inwiefern wird nachhaltiger genutzt, nachdem die interne 
und/oder die externe Kohärenz angestiegen sind?  
Welche Wirkungen haben Regimeveränderungen für den Ressourcenbestand? Dies ist die 
zentrale Frage unseres Vorhabens. Wir hatten bereits in unserem Forschungsantrag von 
1998 postuliert, dass "umfassende Ressourcensteuerung … nur möglich (wird), wenn es 
gelingt, integrierte institutionelle Ressourcenregime einzuführen."  
 
Das Konzept der institutionellen Regime (IR) 
Institutionelle Regime bestehen gemäss dem IR-Ansatz zum einen aus der eigentumsrechtli-
chen Grundordnung (= regulatives System), die bestimmte Verfügungs- oder Nutzungsrechte 
am Stock, an den Erträgen oder an (einzelnen) Gütern und Dienstleistungen umschreibt und 
diese berechtigten Einzelpersonen, Personengruppen oder öffentlichen Körperschaften zu-
weist oder als dem Privateigentum nicht zugängliche Gemeinschaftsgüter (res nullius) defi-
niert. Hinzu kommen als zweite definitorische Komponente ressourcen- oder aktivitätsspezifi-
sche öffentliche Schutz- oder Nutzungspolitiken, die den durch die Eigentumsordnung konsti-
tuierten Rechtssubjekten oder von diesen Politiken selbst neu definierten Zielgruppen be-
stimmte Nutzungsrechte, Schutzpflichten oder Nutzungsbeschränkungen zuteilen oder aufer-
legen. Diese bezwecken die Reproduktionsfähigkeit des Ressourcenstockes zu erhalten, den 
Ertrag dieser Reproduktion für eine bestimmte (meist wirtschaftliche) Aktivität zu sichern 
und/oder die Gesamtmenge der entnommen Güter und Dienstleistungen nach Massgabe be-
stimmter politischer Zielsetzungen zu begrenzen oder in anderer Weise zu verteilen (Knoepfel 
et al. 2001: 35 ff.). 
 
Institutionelle Regime natürlicher Ressourcen (IR-Konzept) in der Praxis 
In der Praxis lassen sich institutionelle Regime natürlicher Ressourcen zusammenfassend 
durch folgende vier Merkmale charakterisieren: 
"y Regionaler Perimeter. Dieser wird durch physische Flüsse von Gütern und Dienstleistun-
gen zwischen Stock und aneignenden, produzierenden oder endnutzenden Akteuren geo-
graphisch determiniert. Im Zentrum findet die Entnahme der wichtigsten Güter und 
Dienstleistungen statt; an deren Peripherie finden sich die Ressourcennutzer4. Dieser Pe-
rimeter bildet damit in der Regel den Lebens- und Wirkungsraum der hauptsächlichsten 
Ressourcennutzer. Allerdings wird diese geographische Determinante in vielen Fällen 
durch eine gesellschaftliche oder politische Konstruktion relativiert, modifiziert oder gar 
ersetzt. So finden sich im Zeitalter einer quasi totalen Überbauung im schweizerischen 
Mittelland vielfach keine soziogeographischen Gründe für Gemeinde-, Regions- oder 
Kantonsgrenzen (Ressource Boden). Ähnliches gilt für geomorphologisch nicht begründe-
te, lediglich durch ändernde Namensgebungen ersichtliche Wald- oder Gewässerperime-
ter. 
                                                 
4  Produzenten und mitunter auch die Endnutzer.  
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• Der Bestand expliziter, für die ganze Ressource gültiger (und damit regional wirksamer) 
Regulierungen für einzelne oder alle Güter und Dienstleistungen einer Ressource, für die 
lokal Nutzungsrivalitäten auftreten können5. Solche Rivalitäten und entsprechende Regu-
lierungen sind allerdings für den Bestand der Gesamtressource nur dann von Bedeutung, 
wenn deren Lösung eine Modifikation anderer Nutzungen derselben Ressource im glei-
chen Perimeter erfordert. Von einer solchen Rivalität kann bei örtlich vollständig isolier-
baren Nutzungskonflikten nicht gesprochen werden, weil sie für die Erneuerbarkeit der 
Gesamtressource bedeutungslos sind. Das ist etwa der Fall bei sporadisch wiederkehren-
den örtlich begrenzten Wassernutzungskonflikten in Gebieten, die grossflächig über Was-
ser im Überfluss verfügen6. Umgekehrt lassen sich echte Rivalitäten in der Praxis nicht 
dadurch lösen, dass die Regulierungen den Perimeter der Ressource ad libitum ausdehnen. 
Denn Perimeterverschiebungen schaffen oft neue Rivalitäten rund um neu angezapfte (an-
dere) Ressourcen. 
Wie ausgeführt, ist der Bestand akuter Rivalitäten kein Garant für die empirische Existenz 
eines Regimes. Dies gilt selbst dann, wenn die nationale Gesetzgebung den Aufbau eines 
solchen Regimes fordert. Umgekehrt kann der Nichtbestand von konfliktreichen Rivalitä-
ten auch auf das befriedigende Funktionieren eines tatsächlich bestehenden Regimes hin-
weisen. 
• Der Bestand empirisch beobachtbarer Umsetzungsaktivitäten politisch-administrativer 
Akteure von Programmen öffentlicher Schutz- und Nutzungspolitiken gegenüber identifi-
zierten Zielgruppen. Diese treten meist in Gestalt von Aktionsplänen und konkreten Poli-
cy-Outputs (Bewilligungen, Konzessionen, Nutzungsbeschränkungen) auf, die sich auf 
ein und dieselbe Ressource beziehen. Solche Politikumsetzungsaktivitäten sind bestrebt, 
nach Massgabe einer bestimmten Schutz- oder Nutzungszielsetzung Verhaltensänderun-
gen durchzusetzen. Dabei definieren sie oft auch Eigentums-, Verfügungs- oder Nutzungs-
rechte der nach der eigentumsrechtlichen Grundordnung berechtigten Akteure an den re-
gulierten Gütern und Dienstleistungen inhaltlich und/oder mengenmässig neu. Dies ge-
schieht dadurch, dass die zuständigen behördlichen Akteure im Ressourcenperimeter 
punktuell oder flächendeckend  
- selbst Eigentumstitel erwerben, um von den betroffenen Gütern und Dienstleistungen 
einen anderen Gebrauch zu machen oder diese anderen Akteuren zuzuführen (Ankauf 
oder formelle Expropriation); 
- Verfügungs- und Nutzungsrechte qualitativ oder quantitativ im Interesse der Zielset-
zungen der öffentlichen Schutz- und Nutzungspolitiken modifizieren (materielle Ent-
eignung mit Entschädigungsfolgen infolge bedeutsamen Beschränkungen der Hand-
lungsspielräume der vorhandenen Nutzer; Beispiel: Rückzonung baureifen Landes); 
- solche Rechte im Interessen der öffentlichen Schutz- und Nutzungspolitiken marginal 
beschränken, ohne dabei entschädigungspflichtig zu werden. (Beispiel: Zonenplanrevi-
sion); 
- Eigentums-, Verfügungs- oder Nutzungsrechte im Interesse konfliktfreierer Beziehun-
gen unter den Berechtigten mit den Mitteln des Privatrechts präziser definieren (ohne 
dadurch notwendigerweise die Handlungsspielräume der berechtigten Nutzer wesent-
                                                 
5  Das können sowohl tatsächlich angewandte eidgenössische, als auch kantonale oder (inter)kommunale Regu-
lierungen sein. 
6  Vgl. dazu unten: Subcases, Abschnitt 4. 
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lich einzuschränken; Beispiel: Festlegung von Grenzabständen in den kantonalen Ein-
führungsgesetzen zum Zivilgesetzrecht). 
Der damit angestrebte Abbau von Konflikten, die auf Rivalitäten zurückgehen, erfolgt 
entweder durch Klärungen bzw. Modifizierungen der Rechte in der eigentumsrechtlichen 
Grundordnung ("regulatives System") und/oder durch eine parallel dazu erfolgende neue 
Regulierung für bestimmte Güter und Dienstleistungen im Rahmen öffentlicher Politiken. 
Bezweckt wird die Lösung von Nutzerproblemen anderer Akteure. Auf diese Weise prä-
sentiert sich die dem IR-Ansatz zugrunde gelegte Formel, wonach sich Regime aus den 
beiden interagierenden Komponenten "Policy-Design" und "regulatives System" (= eigen-
tumsrechtliche Grundordnung) zusammensetzen, im konkreten Feld sehr anschaulich. 
• Das Vorhandensein identifizierbarer Akteurgemeinschaften rund um die relevanten (rivali-
sierenden oder ehemals rivalisierenden) Güter und Dienstleistungen. Darin finden sich 
mindestens die zwei Koalitionen der Nutzungsberechtigten und der Nicht-
Nutzungsberechtigten." (Knoepfel et al. 2003). 
Bereits für das Screening der IR-Ressourcen Boden, Wasser, Wald, Luft und Landschaft im 
ersten Projektteil (Knoepfel et al. 2001) und die dort identifizierten letzten grossen Verände-
rungen der nationalen Regimedeterminanten verwenden wir folgende vier Regimetypen: 
• Kein Regime: Es fehlen für Stock, jährliche Ernte und für die meisten der heute denkbaren 
Güter und Dienstleistungen eigentumsrechtliche Bestimmungen und jedwelche öffentli-
chen Politiken. 
• Einfaches Regime: Für Stock, Ernte und einige (wenige) der heute denkbaren Güter und 
Dienstleistungen besteht ein und dieselbe eigentumsrechtliche Grundordnung; öffentliche 
Politiken fehlen weitgehend. Als einfaches Regime gilt auch die Situation, in der nur eine 
oder ganz wenige der Güter und Dienstleistungen eigentumsrechtlich und/oder durch eine 
öffentliche Politik reguliert werden. 
• Komplexes Regime: Für ein und dieselbe Ressource besteht ein relativ differenziertes re-
gulatives System (unterschiedliche Eigentumstitel, Verfügungs- und Nutzungsrechte für 
den Stock oder für die Güter und Dienstleistungen bzw. nur für diese letzteren) und/oder 
diese Letzteren werden (z.B. je Aktivitätsbereich) von einer Vielzahl öffentlicher Sekt-
oralpolitiken reguliert, die insbesondere auf der Ebene der einschlägigen Policy-Designs 
oder der dazugehörigen (mehr oder weniger zentralisierten) institutionellen Akteurarran-
gements weitgehend unkoordiniert nebeneinander existieren.  
• Integriertes Regime: Solche nach der zentralen Projekthypothese für die Nachhaltigkeit 
ideale Regime zeichnen sich durch ein ausgeprägtes Ausmass der abgedeckten Güter und 
Dienstleistungen, durch ein kohärentes regulatives System, durch starke Interpolicy-
Koordination auf der Ebene der öffentlichen Politiken und durch hohe Kompatibilität von 
Policy-Designs und regulativem System aus. Diese hohe Kohärenz wird wesentlich mitbe-
stimmt durch eine intensive Koordination der beteiligten Akteure.  
Diese vier Regimetypen lassen sich nach Massgabe ihres variierenden Ausmasses (Anzahl der 
einbezogenen Güter und Dienstleistungen und Modalität ihrer Verknüpfung) und ihrer Kohä-
renz (Koordination unter den Akteuren durch Regeln im Policy-Design, im regulativen Sys-
tem und zur wechselseitigen Beziehung zwischen diesen beiden Regimekomponenten) im 
Rahmen einer Vierfeldermatrix wiedergeben (Abb.1).  
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Abbildung 1: IR - Typen  
Kohärenz (Akteurkoordination)  
tief hoch 
klein Kein Regime Einfaches Regime Ausmass ("étendue", 
"extent") der einbe-
zogenen Güter und 
Dienstleistungen 
gross Komplexes Regime Integriertes Regime  
 
Die für die Analyse des regulativen Systems und des Policy-Designs gleichermassen verwen-
dete Dimension des Ausmasses der Regime ("Anzahl der einbezogenen Güter und Dienstleis-
tungen") hat sich als robust erwiesen. Im Hinblick auf eine genaue Bestimmung der Kohärenz 
der Regime mussten demgegenüber die Akteure stärker gewichtet werden. Denn entgegen 
unserer ursprünglichen Annahme ist ein institutionelles Regime nicht schon dann als kohärent 
zu betrachten, wenn sein Policy-Design aufgrund seiner Kausal- und Interventionshypothesen 
in sich stimmig ist. Kohärenz verlangt ausserdem, dass die darin identifizierten Zielgruppen 
mit den im regulativen System ausgewiesenen nutzungs- bzw. verfügungsberechtigten 
Rechtssubjekten (auf den Ebenen der Eigentümer, der Nutzungsberechtigten und der Endnut-
zer) übereinstimmen oder im Falle ihrer Nichtidentität durch wirksame Mechanismen zwin-
gend miteinander koordiniert werden. Diese Bedingung erfüllen einfache und integrierte Re-
gime, die sich allerdings bezüglich ihres Ausmasses deutlich unterscheiden . 
"Keine Regime" und "komplexe Regime" unterscheiden sich ebenfalls bezüglich des Ausmas-
ses der einbezogenen Güter und Dienstleistungen. Sie gleichen sich indessen bezüglich ihrer 
mangelnden Kohärenz. Dadurch unterscheiden sie sich beide von integrierten Regimen. Denn 
bei ihnen stellen weder die eigentumsrechtliche Grundordnung (in der heutigen Schweiz vor-
nehmlich das Zivilrecht; im Mittelalter: das System der plura dominia), noch die Policy-
Designs (etwa auf der Ebene der (zielgruppenspezifischen) Interventionsinstrumente oder 
ihrer administrativen Arrangements) hinlängliche Mechanismen für eine zwingende Koordi-
nation unter den Akteuren sicher. Die Konsequenz daraus sind abgeschottete Akteurarenen 
und sich widersprechende Aktionspläne bzw. Politikoutputs (etwa der Wassernutzungs- und 
der Wasserschutzpolitik). 
Das auf den vorgetragenen Fallstudien basierende zweite Buch (Knoepfel et al. 2003) enthält 
eine konzeptionelle Weiterentwicklung dieses hier vorgetragenen IR-Ansatzes, auf die hier 
verwiesen sei. Danach unterscheiden wir innerhalb der vier Regimekategorien im Sinne der 
Veränderungsdynamik der Regime stabile und instabile Regime. Diese Unterscheidung geht 
darauf zurück, dass die (interne oder – vor allem – externe) Kohärenz durch entsprechende 
substantielle (inhaltliche Umschreibung der Nutzungsrechte oder der Politikziele) und/oder 
institutionelle (Koordinationspflichten etc.) Regelungen abgesichert ist oder nicht. Instabile 
Regime lassen den Akteuren grosse Spielräume und sind daher veränderungsanfälliger als 
stabile. Daraus resultiert folgende (in den meisten Fallstudien angewandte) Typologie: 
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Tabelle 1Verfeinerte Qualifizierung der Regimetypen 
 Niedrige Kohärenz Hohe Kohärenz 
 Niedrige 
interne Ko-
härenz im 
RS 
(selten in 
CH) 
 
Niedrige 
interne Ko-
härenz im 
PD 
(häufig in 
CH) 
 
Niedrige exter-
ne Kohärenz 
des IR 
 
 
 
= stabile ex-
terne Inkohä-
renz 
Hohe externe 
Kohärenz trotz 
niedriger interner 
Kohärenz im 
PD* 
 
= instabile ex-
terne Kohärenz  
Hohe in-
terne Ko-
härenz im 
RS 
Hohe inter-
ne Kohärenz
im PD  
Hohe externe 
Kohärenz des 
IR 
 
 
 
=stabile ex-
terne Kohä-
renz 
Niedrige externe 
Kohärenz trotz 
hoher Kohärenz im 
PD und im RS 
 
= instabile externe 
Inkohärenz 
KLEINES RELATIVES AUSMASS  
Vor und nach dem Change bestehen 
bedeutsame Regulierungslücken (Zahl 
der explizit regulierten Güter und 
Dienstleistungen ist kleiner als jene der 
(potentiell) rivalisierenden Güter und 
Dienstleistungen 
   
 
Stabiles no – 
regime 
 
 
Instabiles no-
Regime 
   
 
Stabiles ein-
faches Re-
gime 
 
 
Instabiles einfa-
ches Regime 
GROSSES RELATIVES AUSMASS 
Alle relevanten (pozentiell) rivalisieren-
den Güter und Dienstleistungen einer 
(regionalen) Ressource werden durch 
explizite Regulierungen (regulatives 
System und/oder öffentliche Politiken) 
abgedeckt (relative Ausdehnung = 1) 
   
 
Stabiles kom-
plexes Regime 
 
 
Instabiles kom-
plexes Regime 
   
 
Stabiles integ-
riertes Re-
gime 
 
 
Instabiles integ-
riertes Regime 
 
* Die Variante eines inkohärenten RS beim Wasser ist denkbar, kommt indessen in den zwei Ressourcen Boden und Wald in der Schweiz kaum vor. 
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Auswahl der Fallstudien 
Die Auswahl der regionalen Ressourcen, die Gegenstand der Fallstudien sind, erfolgte auf-
grund von allgemeinen und ressourcenspezifischen Kriterien. Für alle Fallstudien kamen fol-
gende Kriterien zur Anwendung:  
• Die Nutzungssituation ist durch starke Nutzungsrivalitäten gekennzeichnet, die sich 
auch an Konflikten zwischen verschiedenen Ressourcennutzern äussern können. 
• Die fokussierten Nutzungsrivalitäten waren Gegenstand der (in den Screenings ausge-
wiesenen) Revision/Anpassung der nationalen Regimedeterminanten. 
• Die Eigentumsverhältnisse variieren (ortzeitlich) bzw. die Ressourcen weisen unter-
schiedliche Eigentümer (im speziellen öffentliches und privates Eigentum) auf. 
• Die Perimeter der Ressourcensysteme sind bezüglich Grösse und Komplexität ver-
gleichbar. 
• Die forschungsökonomische Machbarkeit der Fallstudie inkl. Zugang zur Dokumentati-
on wie auch die Möglichkeit, die Auswirkungen der Regimeveränderungen über einen 
längeren Zeitraum zu beobachten, sind gegeben 
Ressourcenspezifisch und damit stärker situativ mussten folgende Kriterien berücksichtigt 
werden:  
• Es handelt sich um für die Ressource repräsentative Nutzungskonflikte. 
• Es werden die Auswirkungen der Veränderungen der nationalen Komponenten der Res-
sourcenregime untersucht, die für die regimespezifischen Veränderungen charakteris-
tisch sind.  
Aufgrund dieser Kriterien wurden folgende Fallstudien ausgewählt (Abbildung 2). 
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Abbildung 2: Ausgewählte Fallstudien über lokale institutionellen 
Regime für die Ressourcen Boden, Wasser und Wald 
Gebietsbezeich-
nung (inkl. Kan-
ton) 
Fläche / 
Einzugs 
gebiet 
Untersuchte Güter und Dienst-
leistungen  
Untersu-
chungs 
periode 
Ressource Boden 
1. Bielersee (BE) Seeufer 1.  Schifflandeplätze  
2. Zweit(Ferien)wohnungen  
3.  Infrastrukturnutzung (SBB, 
NS5) 
4. Seeufer-Wanderweg  
1930 (65) - 
1985 
2. Rückzonung 
Hueb (BE) 
Periurbane 
Landschaft 
1.  Wohnnutzung und Fruchtfolge-
flächen 
1960 - 1990 
3. Agglomeration 
Lausanne (VD) 
Agglomera-
tion und ihr 
Hinterland 
1.  Wohnnutzung versus Grünflä-
chen 
2.  Wohnnutzung versus Rebflä-
chen 
3. Wohnnutzung versus landwirt-
schaftliche Nutzung 
1960 - 1985 
Ressource Wasser 
4. Val de Bagnes 
(VS) 
300 km2 1.  Elektrizitätsnutzung und Rest-
wassermengen 
2.  Trinkwassernutzung  
3.  Abfallsenke (ARA's) 
1975 - 2001 
5. Unterlauf Thur 
(ZH) 
120 km2 1. Hochwasser- und Auenschutz 
2. Restwassermengen und Entwäs-
serung 
3. Elektrizitätsproduktion 
1975-2001 
6. Seetal ( Baldeg-
ger- und Hallwiler-
see) (AG, LU) 
138 km2 1. Senke für Haushalte, Industrie 
und Gewerbe 
2. Senke für die Landwirtschaft 
3. Seeuferschutz 
1975-2001 
7. Valle Maggia 
(TI) 
600 km2 1.  Elektrizitätsgewinnung und 
Restwassermengen  
2.  Industrienutzung (Kies, Gneiss) 
versus Auenschutz 
3.  Hochwasser- und Auenschutz 
1975-2001 
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Gebietsbezeich-
nung (inkl. Kan-
ton) 
Fläche / 
Einzugs 
gebiet 
Untersuchte Güter und Dienstleis-
tungen 
Untersu-
chungs 
periode 
Ressource Wald 
Melioration Wild-
berg (ZH) 
1200 ha 1. Ausbau von Erschliessungstrassen 
(Holznutzung, Erholung, Biodi-
versität) 
2. Abstand von Feldstrassen zum 
Wald (Landwirtschaft, Biodiversi-
tät) 
1985-2002 
Pfynwald (VS)   1600 ha 1. Verkehrsinfrastruktur und Natur-
schutz 
2. Verkehrsinfrastruktur und Erho-
lung und Tourismus  
3.  Erholung und Tourismus und Na-
turschutz 
1980-2002 
Gurtenwald (BE) 200 ha 1. Holznutzung versus Naturschutz  
2.  Naturschutz versus Erholung 
1985-2002 
 
Zum Forschungsvorgehen 
Das Forschnungsprotokoll, das für die Durchführung jeder Fallstudie zur Anwendung kam, 
umfasst Vorgaben zu den Forschungsschritten und zu untersuchenden Dimensionen, zu den 
dabei zu berücksichtigenden Prinzipien wie auch zum Inhaltsverzeichnis der Fallstudien. 
Prinzipiellen Charakter für die Forschungsstrategie hatten folgende Überlegungen:  
• Güter- und dienstleistungsorientierter Ansatz: Für die gewählten Ressourcen sollten im 
lokalen/regionalen Raum die genutzten Güter und Dienstleistungen sowie die Nutzergrup-
pen identifiziert und analysiert werden.  
• Diachrone Betrachtung: Zur Überprüfung der Wirkungen von Änderungen der nationalen 
Regimedeterminanten wurden mindestens zwei Zeitpunkte miteinander verglichen. Der 
diachrone Vergleich erfordert Aussagen zum Regimetyp, zu den Rivalitäten, zur tatsächli-
chen Nutzung und zur Bewertung der Nutzung für den Erhalt der Ressource vor und nach 
dem in den Screenings identifizierten (letzten) Regimechange. Gefragt wurde demzufolge 
nach den institutionellen Anreizen für die identifizierten Akteurgruppen, die zu den unter-
schiedlichen Zeitpunkten deren Verhalten bestimmt haben. 
• Bottum-up-Approach: Ausgangspunkt der Erhebungen sind nicht rechtliche Vorgaben, 
sondern die tatsächlich im Ressourcenperimeter beobachteten Nutzungen. Die Gegenüber-
stellung mit den nationalen Änderungen erlaubt Aussagen darüber, inwieweit die neu fest-
gesetzten institutionellen Anreize überhaupt in den lokalen Raum „übersetzt“ worden sind. 
• Prozessanalyse: Um mögliche Veränderungen über die Zeit verstehen zu können, wurden 
soweit möglich Prozessanalysen vorgenommen. 
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Zur Figur der "Subcases" 
Die interessierenden Nutzungsrivalitäten und die darauf bezogenen Entscheidungsprozesse 
beziehen sich kaum je auf den gesamten Perimeter der Ressource. Sie betreffen vielmehr spe-
zifische Teilräume. 
In diesen Räumen finden die politisch-administrativen Entscheidungsprozesse ihren Aus-
gangspunkt. Auch wenn als gemeinsames Referenzsystem der Akteure nicht nur dieser Teil-
raum, sondern der gesamte regionale Ressourcenperimeter präsent bleibt und sich unter den 
Akteuren deshalb auch Vertreter überörtlicher Gruppen aus der Nachbarschaft befinden, ist 
der sozio-geographisch determinierte regionale Perimeter aus politikwissenschaftlicher Sicht 
ein analytisches Konstrukt. In keinem der untersuchten schweizerischen Ressourcenperimeter 
gibt es so etwas wie (regionale) öffentlich-rechtliche Ressourcenkörperschaften, in denen 
gleichzeitig Stock, Erntemengen und sämtliche entnommenen Güter und Dienstleistungen 
koordiniert reguliert und auftretende Rivalitäten politisch entschieden würden. 
Aus diesem Grunde haben wir uns in Abstimmung mit dem internationalen Projekt Euware-
ness1 dazu entschieden, die empirischen Studien auf sog. Subcases zu konzentrieren. Subcases 
sind geographisch definierte Orte, an denen einzelne Güter oder Dienstleistungen der in den 
Fallstudien fokussierten regionalen Ressourcen in besonderer Weise genutzt werden (Über- 
oder Unternutzung) und dadurch die Nutzung anderer, rivalisierender Güter und Dienst-
leistungen derselben Ressource ernsthaft bedrohen. Solche Nutzungssituationen gefährden 
daher die Erneuerbarkeit der gesamten regionalen Ressource (sofern anderswo die bisherigen 
Nutzungen der betroffenen Güter und Dienstleistungen beibehalten werden). Solche Subcases 
beziehen sich damit auf Orte, an denen bestimmte, auch anderswo im Perimeter genutzte Gü-
ter und Dienstleistungen besonders intensiv oder extensiv genutzt werden, sofern dadurch die 
Nutzung anderer (vielfach ökologischer) Dienstleistungen in der bisherigen oder in einer poli-
tisch gewollt zu verändernder Weise in Frage gestellt wird.  
Ein Subcase stellt damit immer einen Entscheidungsprozess dar, der sich auf zwei prinzipiell 
unterschiedliche geographische Ort bezieht, nämlich auf den Ort der besonders problemati-
schen Nutzung eines Gutes und den oder die Orte der dadurch ausgelösten Veränderungen 
und ihrer Auswirkungen auf dieselbe Ressource. Dementsprechend sind in den analysierten 
Entscheidungsprozessen der Subcases immer mindestens zwei bestimmte Güter und Dienst-
leistungen in Anspruch nehmende lokale Akteurgruppen präsent. In den meisten untersuchten 
Fällen treten in diesen Prozessen aber auch regionale Akteure auf, die zwischen diesen beiden 
Interessengruppen zu vermitteln suchen und auf diese Weise die Interessen eines konfliktfrei-
en Weiterbestands der bisherigen Nutzung der betroffenen Güter und Dienstleistungen aus-
serhalb der besonders betroffenen Orte vertreten. 
Mit der forschungsstrategischen Fokalisierung auf solche Subcases geht die Annahme einher, 
dass sich die Entwicklungsdynamik des institutionellen Ressourcenregimes, die wir mittels 
der Dimension Ausmass und Kohärenz messen, in der Fähigkeit dieser an verschiedenen Ri-
valitätsfronten operierenden Akteure ausdrückt, die Rechte der konkurrierenden Nutzerinnen 
und Nutzer verbindlich aufeinander abzustimmen. Dies geschieht über den Einsatz neuer oder 
bestehender öffentlicher Politiken (des Bundes oder der Kantone) und damit einhergehender 
oder davon mehr oder weniger unabhängiger Umverteilungen der Nutzungsrechte innerhalb 
oder zwischen den Güter- und Dienstleistungskategorien. Dadurch soll die Erneuerbarkeit der 
                                                 
1  Cf. Bressers, Kuks 2002. 
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regionalen Ressource erhalten bleiben. Die physischen Prozesse der Selbsterneuerung dieser 
Ressource müssen dabei nicht an den gleichen Orten stattfinden, wie die Nutzung ihrer Güter 
und Dienstleistungen. 
 
Zu den Nachhaltigkeitsindikatoren 
Bereits zum Zeitpunkt der Antragstellung war uns bewusst, dass auch bezüglich den verwen-
deten Nachhaltigkeitsindikatoren Vorsicht geboten sein würde. Es kann nicht Aufgabe eines 
sozialwissenschaftlichen Forschungsvorhabens sein, im Feld selbst Daten zu einschlägigen 
Nachhaltigkeitsindikatoren zu erheben. Wir haben uns deshalb bei der Beurteilung der Nach-
haltigkeitswirkungen der untersuchten regionalen Regimeveränderungen mit der Dokumenta-
tion verfügbarer Daten begnügt. Die Indikatoren selbst stammen aus den mittlerweile recht 
detaillierten Indikatorenlisten, die heute in Politik, Verwaltung oder Wissenschaft zur An-
wendung gelangen. Für jede Ressource wurden daraus je drei Indikatoren zur ökologischen, 
wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Nachhaltigkeit ausgewählt, für die wir im Feld Daten für die 
Situation vor und nach dem Regimechange fanden. 
Vorsichtshalber haben wir in den Fallstudien auf evaluative Gesamtstatements verzichtet. Es 
gibt heute und vermutlich auch in naher Zukunft keine verlässlichen Methoden, die es erlau-
ben, Befunde zu diesen drei Indikatorenfamilien gegeneinander abzugleichen. Dasselbe gilt 
vermutlich bereits innerhalb einer jeden dieser Indikatorengruppen. Deshalb haben wir uns 
damit begnügt, feststellbare Veränderungen entlang dieser Indikatoren zu dokumentieren und 
auf dieser Grundlage annäherungsweise Aussagen zu Trends, nicht aber zum (absoluten) 
Stand der nachhaltigen Nutzung der verschiedenen Ressourcen zu formulieren. 
 
Gemeinsame Struktur der Fallstudien 
Die zehn Fallstudien weisen dieselbe Grundstruktur auf, die das Forschungsteam zu Beginn 
der Redaktionsarbeiten im Interesse einer vergleichenden Lesbarkeit festgelegt hat. Diese 
präsentiert sich folgendermassen: 
1. Einleitung: Begründung der Fallstudienauswahl, Begründung und Umschreibung des ge-
wählten Perimeters. 
2. Der Perimeter und die Subcases: Geographische, morphologische und soziopolitische 
Beschreibung des Perimeters; tabellarische Auflistung der betroffenen Güter und Dienst-
leistungen der Ressource; Auswahl der analysierten Nutzungsrivalitäten (Subcases). 
3. Nachhaltigkeitskriterien: Präsentation der verwendeten (quantitativen und teilweise auch 
qualitativen) Messgrössen für die Auswirkungen des Regimewandels. 
4. Allgemeine Chronologie: Ereignisse und Entscheidungsprozesse auf der Ebene des Ge-
samtperimeters und der Subcases. 
5. Situation vor dem analysierten Regimechange: Situation des Regimes; eigentumsrechtli-
che Grundordnung und wirksame öffentliche Schutz- und Nutzungspolitiken und daraus 
resultierende Nutzungssituationen; Situation auf der Ebene der zwei bis vier Subcases so-
wie Evaluation der Kohärenz und des Ausmasses des vorbestandenen Regimes. 
6. Vergleich der Situation vor und nach dem Regimechange: Darstellung der Beobachtungen 
zu den sich verändernden Regimedimensionen (eigentumsrechtliche Grundordnung und 
Policy-Design); Entwicklung der Ressourcennutzungen während und nach der Regime-
veränderung (auf der Ebene der Gesamtressource sowie innerhalb der Subcases); Verän-
  
12
 
derungen der Kohärenz und des Ausmasses; Nebenfolgen des Regimechanges (Auftreten 
allfälliger neuer Rivalitäten). 
7. Erklärungsfaktoren für den Regimechange: Veränderungsdynamiken. 
8. Auswirkungen des Regimechange: Veränderungen der Nutzungspraktiken und der Nach-
haltigkeitsindikatoren. 
9. Schlussfolgerungen: Notwendige Modifikationen des konzeptionellen Ansatzes? 
 
18. Oktober 2002 
Peter Knoepfel, Ingrid Kissling-Näf, Frédéric Varone 
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Résumé 
Cette étude de cas donne suite à une analyse du régime institutionnel de la ressource eau en 
Suisse entre 1870 et 2000. Elle étudie le changement de régime dans un bassin versant précis, 
celui du fleuve Maggia, durant la période allant de 1975 à 1991, période définie comme capi-
tale dans cette analyse préalable principalement centrée sur le niveau fédéral de gestion de la 
ressource. Son propos est de vérifier si les tendances observées au niveau fédéral se retrouvent 
au niveau local. En terme de changement de régime, la période qui nous intéresse a été quali-
fiée de phase de complexification assortie des premières prémisses d'intégration. Si l'étendue 
du régime est en hausse eu égard à la prise en compte des dimensions qualitatives mais sur-
tout quantitatives de la protection des eaux, la cohérence s'avère plus faible dans la mesure où 
les groupes-cibles sont plus restreints que les acteurs impliqués dans le système régulatif. Il 
s’agit dès lors de vérifier si ces processus se retrouvent au niveau du bassin versant, en analy-
sant l’évolution du système régulatif (droits de propriété et d’usages) et du policy design. 
L’étude de cas examine ces phénomènes en décrivant trois rivalités opposant les usages lo-
caux de la ressource, tout d’abord autour de la production hydroélectrique, ensuite dans le 
domaine de l’extraction de gravier et enfin en ce qui concerne la protection des biens et des 
personnes contre les eaux du fleuve. L’évolution du système régulatif et du policy design sont 
décrits pour chacune de ces rivalités, puis nous évaluons la nature du changement de régime, 
ainsi que son impact sur la durabilité. Les conditions de ce changement de régime au niveau 
du bassin versant sont enfin déterminées. Les résultats de cette étude montrent, entre autre, 
que nous retrouvons à l’échelle du bassin versant le mouvement d’écologisation du régime 
décrit au niveau fédéral. Le changement consacre enfin la prise en compte des conflits d'usage 
de manière globale et intégrée. 
Zusammenfassung 
Diese Fallstudie schliesst an eine Analyse der institutionellen Wasserregime in der Schweiz 
zwischen 1870 und 2000 an. Sie untersucht den Regimewandel im Einzugsgebiet des Flusses 
Maggia zwischen 1975 und 1991, derjenigen Periode also, die im Rahmen der genannten auf 
nationaler Ebene auf das Management der Ressource Wasser ausgerichteten Studie als ent-
scheidende Veränderungsphase definiert worden ist. Die Fallstudie verfolgt das Ziel, die Um-
setzung der beobachteten nationalen Tendenzen auf lokaler Ebene zu überprüfen. Hinsichtlich 
des Regimewandels war diese Phase auf nationaler Ebene als komplexes Regime mit ersten 
Anzeichen von Integration qualifiziert worden. Während sich sein Ausmass im Zusammen-
hang mit der Berücksichtigung von qualitativer wie auch insbesondere der quantitativen Di-
mension des Gewässerschutzes erhöht hat, erwies sich seine Kohärenz als schwächer, weil die 
Zielgruppen umfangmässig stärker begrenzt sind als die betroffenen Akteure im regulativen 
System. Die Analyse der Entwicklung des regulativen Systems (Eigentums- und Nutzungs-
rechte) und des Policy-Designs verfolgte somit den Zweck zu überprüfen, ob diese Prozesse 
auch auf der Ebene des Einzugsgebietes feststellbar sind. Die Fallstudie untersucht diese Phä-
nomene anhand von drei Rivalitätsbereichen rund um die lokale Wassernutzung, nämlich die 
Wasserkraftnutzung, die Entnahme von Materialien aus Gewässern sowie der Schutz von Per-
sonen und Sachgütern vor Überschwemmungen. Die Entwicklung des regulativen Systems 
und des Policy-Designs wird für jede dieser Rivalitäten dargestellt. Anschliessend wird die 
Art des Regimewandels bewertet und dessen Einfluss auf die Nachhaltigkeit der Ressourcen-
nutzung überprüft. Zudem werden die Voraussetzungen für den Regimewandel im Einzugs-
gebiet identifiziert. Die Fallstudie zeigt unter anderem, dass  wir auch auf der Ebene des Ein-
zugsgebietes die auf nationaler Ebene beschriebene Ökologisierung des Regimes vorfinden. 
Der Wandel führt schlussendlich dazu, dass die Nutzungskonflikte auf eine umfassende und 
integrierte Weise in Betracht gezogen werden. 
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1. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE WATER BASIN  
 
1.1 GEOGRAPHICAL AND HYDROLOGICAL ASPECTS 
The Valmaggia valley is the largest in Ticino, covering 1/5 of the area and incorporating 22 
municipalities. The valley presents as a large funnel.  The upper Valmaggia forms the upper 
basin and consists of three valleys spreading out in a fan: the Rovana to the west, the Bavona 
to the northwest and the Lavizzara to the northeast. There are a total of 12 municipalities lo-
cated in the long corridor formed by the base of the lower valley from Avegno to Cavergno 
accounting for 4/5 of the entire population of the Valmaggia over a distance of 25 km. From 
Tegna, the valley ends in a vast delta plunging into Lake Maggiore at the mouth of the Mag-
gia. In this delta, two small towns – Locarno to the east and Ascona to the west – frame the 
river, as it is channelled into its final stretch. There are no significant centres in the Valmaggia 
itself as the population density is very low (less than 20 inhabitants per km2). Economically, 
the valley is endowed with natural resources: its climate and landscape, which are exploited 
by means of tourism; stone, which is quarried to make construction materials; and, finally, 
water, which is used to produce energy. The active population lives and works mainly in the 
Locarno region, at the mouth of the river. Finally, agriculture plays only a very minor part of 
the economy, as the morphology of the terrain, hemmed in by steep hills, is inhospitable to 
this activity.  
From the hydrological point of view, the water basin of the Maggia covers an area of ap-
proximately 930 km2. The course of the river runs along about 50 kilometres from the Naret 
lakes, at an altitude of 2,240 metres, to Lake Maggiore, at 193 metres. Its main tributaries are 
the Lavizzara, the Bavona and the Rovana, flowing through valleys of the same name in the 
upper part of the water basin. Two other tributaries, the Melezza and the Isorno flow into its 
waters at its final stretch. The maximum difference in altitude is found at the first 10-
kilometer stretch of the river. The Maggia flows more gently from the point of its confluence 
with the Bavona, downstream from Bignasco. From the meeting of its waters with the Ra-
vona, it flows at a very gentle gradient of 1% and occupies a large part of the base of the val-
ley in a woven structure. Its last deltaic section is heavily dyked to protect the inhabitants and 
the infrastructure. However, this type of dyke structure affects the remainder of the river only 
rarely and minimumly. The average rate of flow is 24 m3 per second and is strictly linked to 
the pluviometry. The values reach their peak in April and May, accentuated by the melting 
  
2
 
snow; values are also very high in October. The waters of the Maggia can be as devastating as 
they are beneficial. The flow can be dramatically increased from time to time by extremely 
violent and destructive floods. The main causes of these floods are the intensity and abun-
dance of precipitation and the fact that the gradients of the upper water basin are very steep 
and, in general, do not feature a layer of humus to retain the water. In terms of quality, we 
should stress that the waters of the Maggia count amongst the cleanest in the canton. 
 
1.2 WATER USES INVOLVED  
Hydroelectric production 
Two hydroelectric companies operate using  the waters of the Maggia. The SES (Società elet-
trica sopracenerina SA), a private company, currently one of the largest electrical power pro-
ducers in Ticino, carries out its sampling at Avegno and Giumaglio, in the lower part of the 
valley and has two relatively small plants. The second much larger company is OFIMA (Offi-
cine idroelettriche della Maggia SA), a joint venture, 20% owned by the canton of Ticino.1 
The company carries out several samplings (it has 35 catch points in total) and runs six power 
plants. The total output is put at 607 MW and annual production totals approximately 1.2 bil-
lion kWh (Meier 1999: 25). OFIMA releases the waters tapped in the upper part of the Val-
maggia directly into Lake Maggiore. This causes a significant drop in residual water flows 
over the whole course of the river. Since the advent of hydroelectric power production here, 
the Maggia has lost about three quarters of its initial volume of water (Meier 1999: 21). In the 
Riveo region, the averages for the months of June, July and August are now lower than the 
absolute daily minimum levels measured in the twenty-five years prior to hydroelectric pro-
duction (Ufficio arginatura ed estrazioni 1999). 
Geomorphological processes, transport of sediments and natural risks, alteration of the water 
course:  
Since time immemorial, the floods have regularly wreaked their destruction on the cultivated 
lands and infrastructures of the region and taken victims in the valley. Today, despite the pro-
duction of hydroelectric power, which has left only an extremely low residual flow rate in 
certain areas, summer rains can cause dramatic increases in water levels.  In a matter of a few 
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hours the river can become the most powerful and devastating watercourse in Switzerland. 
The flood of 7 August 1978, following exceptionally violent precipitations, affected the whole 
region, causing catastrophic damage and costing many lives. At the time, the Maggia's flow 
was estimated to be 5,000 m3 per sec. To provide protection for people and property, signifi-
cant development has taken place on the final stretch since the 1980s, which had already been 
dyked before the disaster. 
 
Support for recreational activities:  
The most important recreational activity is fishing, popular with the locals but also an attrac-
tion for many tourists.2 In 1997, the catches in the Maggia and its tributaries were assessed at 
approximately 28,000, i.e. 4.4 tonnes of fish. Other recreational activities include canyoning 
and canoeing, diving from the rocky cliffs and swimming. Finally, as one of the main ele-
ments in the Valmaggia landscape, the river in itself constitutes a tourist asset. The region is 
popular with hikers, who appreciate its natural beauty.  
 
A natural habitat for plants and animals: 
Plants and animals are particularly important in this region. The ecological and botanical fea-
tures of this sub-alpine river landscape have long been vaunted.3 Several zones have been 
listed in both cantonal and federal inventories for their ecological value. 
 
Support for gravel quarries:  
The Valmaggia is the site of two quarrying operations: gravel and granite. The quarries are 
located mainly in a limited area between Riveo and Visletto. The average amount of gravel 
taken from the riverbed in this sector is 75,000 m3 for the last ten years. Granite is quarried 
from the cliffs overhanging the Maggia. The quarries are located on the two rocky slopes on 
either side of the river, however the stone-processing operations take place on the banks 
where the largest plants and logistical structures are located. The annual yield from the quar-
ries on the Maggia is in the region of 70,000 m3 of natural stone. For this quantity of stone, 
                                                                                                                                                        
1  At present, the other shareholders are: Nordostschweizerische Kraftwerke (30%), the canton of Basel-Town 
(12.5%), ATEL (Aar et Tessin SA d'électricité), the Zürich municipal authority (10%),  BKW Energie AG 
(10%) and the Berne municipal authority (5%). In addition, OFIMA is a 50% shareholder in the company, 
Aegina SA, which owns the Gries basin and the Altastafel power plant. 
2  However, there is no commercial fishing in the Valmaggia. 
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the total waste produced is 35,000 m3.  This is due to the quarrying process itself and pres-
ence of inferior quality stone. The waste is partly used in the re-processing facilities in the 
quarrying area or it is dumped, in particular around the edges of the river bed, while awaiting 
a solution for re-use of the waste materials. Recent estimates put these granite deposits at 3-5 
million m3 with annual growth in the region of 30,000 - 80,000 m3 (Ufficio Arginatura ed 
estrazioni 1999).  
The Valmaggia offers other uses for the water resource but these are of less concern to us in 
the present instance. Uses include the consumption of drinking water, as well as provision of 
the strategic reserve for fire fighting and irrigation. 
 
 
2 REGIME HISTORY OF THE WATER BASIN 
2.1 REGIME HISTORY, MAINLY DURING RECENT DECADES 
It is possible to consider changes in the regime at various levels. We analysed the historical 
background to changes at federal level (Reynard et al. 2000) and outline below the determin-
ing factors in relation to this case study. We also observed the changes at cantonal level and, 
finally, the consequences on the ground at the level of the water basin. We defined the deter-
mining period for the change of regime at federal level, the period from the mid-1970s to the 
early 1990s. This crucial period opens with the adoption in 1975 of Article 24 (24 b and 24 
quater) of the Federal Constitution. This article supplements the measures already in place 
designed to protect the quality of the water with the obligation to extend this protection to the 
quantitative level. This period of change ends with the adoption in October 1991 of the Fed-
eral Law on the Protection of Water.  This law was enacted to legislate for the requirements 
of the new article to the constitution and imposes, in particular, minimum  residual water flow 
levels. In terms of regime change, this period was also characterised by an increasingly com-
plex phase with the initial premises of integration (Mauch et al. 2000: 22). Whereas the scope 
of the regime may have expanded (incorporating both the qualitative and quantitative dimen-
sions of water protection), there is little sign of coherence insofar as the target groups are 
more restricted than the actors involved in the regulatory system, as a result of the long delay 
in implementing the new article of the Constitution adopted in1975. We have to wait until 
                                                                                                                                                        
3  (See in particular, Ceschi 1976.)   Rampazzi's 1993 study had a particular impact in this domain. 
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1991 for the enactment of the Federal Law on the Protection of Water to observe coherence at 
this level with an obligation on the cantons to apply adequate quantitative protection meas-
ures. This change is evident at two levels:  the canton and the water basins, and it may be 
spread out over time across the various regions. As we shall see, quantitative protection of the 
water resources dates back to 1976 in Ticino, anticipating the changes in the federal regime 
by a wide margin. At the level of the water basin, protective measures were applied in 1982, a 
full 10 years before the enactment of the Federal Law.  
As regards the regulatory system, generally speaking, formal ownership rights have not 
changed. In the Valmaggia, as in the rest of the Ticino area, the water belongs to the canton. 
What has changed, however, is the granting of use rights by the canton, mainly in that some 
of these have been restricted. In Ticino, this change is implemented through amendments to 
the Cantonal Law on the Use of Water of May 17, 1894. As regards the water basin itself, 
1982 saw such limitations take effect with changes to hydroelectric licenses. The study of this 
water basin further illustrates the changes that we paid less attention to during the study of the 
regime at federal level. In particular, we refer to the restriction of rights to gravel quarrying 
following the later suspension of the authorisations granted by the canton at the end of the 
1990s. 
In terms of policy design, generally speaking we observed co-ordination between the three 
main branches of water policy (protection against water, exploitation of the water resource 
and protection of the water) inasmuch as restrictions are imposed on one of these uses in the 
interests of protecting the other two, i.e. mainly on exploitation. In the water basin, this phe-
nomenon is reflected in a bias in favour of the resource's function as a natural habitat over 
exploitation uses (such as hydropower production and gravel quarrying). A series of legisla-
tive measures, designed to protect not only the water, but also the landscape, other natural 
resources and fisheries, were implemented at both federal and cantonal level. We also see 
evidence of a compromise between protecting people and property against flooding and pro-
tecting the water as a natural habitat, developed in the context of protecting the riverbanks. In 
terms of instruments, changes mainly come about through changes to the regulatory system, 
in particular by way of amendments to concessions or authorisations with a view to limiting 
use rights. In addition, instruments that were initially created for other regimes, such as the 
land or the landscape, also had an impact on changes to the water regime. Of these, of concern 
to us are the Inventories (for example the Inventory of Alluvial Sites of National Importance) 
and the plans for municipal allocations. Also significant is the right to appeal granted to non-
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governmental organisations representing the interests of environmental protection. Finally, we 
should highlight the role of a unique feature of the Swiss political system, i.e. the Popular 
Initiative. Changes in the target groups are based on causal hypotheses. In general, we have 
seen an expansion of the target groups to include all users of the resource in that quantitative 
protection was added to qualitative protection of the water. In terms of the hypotheses them-
selves, this phase consists of the application of the principle according to which nature has a 
formal right to protection as a natural habitat and a natural heritage.  Thus, we see the scope 
of protective legislation for water counterbalancing the two other branches. Finally, we would 
draw your attention to the co-ordination efforts between the various policies that have an im-
pact on water since the 1990s. Since this time, there has been an attempt to regulate the rival-
ries that exist between all of the water uses at institutional level. 
 
2.2 SELECTED RIVALRIES 
There are several rival uses involved in studying changes in the federal regime. Naturally, all 
of these will not be reflected in the Valmaggia. The rivalries to take into account at the level 
of the water basin do, however, reflect the main conflict evident at federal level, that is to say, 
exploitation versus protection. We decided to deal with three main rivalries broken down into 
three sub-cases: 
- fishing 
- recreational activities and landscape 
- consumption of drinking water 
1. Hydroelectric power production versus 
- natural habitat 
- natural habitat 
- recreational activities and landscape 
- protection against water 
2. Quarrying of gravel and granite versus 
- fishing 
- natural habitat 3. Protection against water versus 
- recreational activities and landscape 
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Some uses of the water resources in the Valmaggia do not currently pose any rivalry prob-
lems, i.e.  absorption of waste and irrigation. Regulations governing the first of these uses 
were set in place before the change period, in the framework of policies designed to protect 
the quality of the water. Due to the very limited agricultural activities in the area, irrigation 
constitutes a marginal use of water in this water basin. In addition, a fourth rivalry is not in-
corporated in our study as it appeared only after the change phase, at the end of the 1990s. 
This fourth use consists of creating artificial basins with strategic reserves to be used in case 
of fire. This new use of the water resource mainly rivals the priority of the area as a natural 
habitat. 
The first rivalry concerns hydroelectric power production. This activity drastically reduces the 
river's runoff compromising the water's fundamental role in alluvial biotopes, causing serious 
damage to the aquatic fauna, deprived of its natural habitat, and thereby by extension causing 
damage to fishing.  In the initial stages of hydroelectric production, the ground water level 
was actually reduced.  Finally, it constitutes a threat to the Valmaggia landscape, as the river 
is the primary element in this landscape. 
The second rivalry is the conflict between gravel and granite quarrying operations and the 
natural habitat and fluvial dynamics, inasmuch as quarrying alters the Maggia riverbed and its 
banks. In addition, these activities disturb the aquatic fauna, hence the rivalry with fishing.  
They change the alluvial landscape and result in hydraulic safety problems disrupting the 
equilibrium of the riverbed. 
The third and final rivalry we will deal with concerns the need to protect people and property 
against the sometimes catastrophic flooding of the Maggia, a need that conflicts with main-
taining a certain natural river dynamic and an environment that promotes the water fauna and 
flora native to the area, and, therefore, the natural habitat. In addition, the dykes constitute a 
threat to the landscape functions of the alluvial area. 
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3  REGIME CHANGES: SUBCASE 1: HYDROELECTRIC 
PRODUCTION 
 
3.1 CHRONOLOGY  
The decision of the canton of Ticino to expand production of hydroelectric energy, which had 
been a modest feature of the Valmaggia since the dawn of the 20th century (SES concession), 
dates back to the early 1950s . The members of the Ticino Grand Conseil [Regional Council] 
voted unanimously to grant a major concession to tap the Maggia hydroelectric resources.  
This concession was granted to OFIMA. The ecological consequences of this decision did not 
enter into the equation at that time. Income from the hydroelectric concession was an impor-
tant source of revenue for the canton. The construction works and operation of the plants cre-
ated employment in a region which was hitherto relatively undeveloped. In 1965, with the 
completion of the first phase of the works and the second phase ready to start, the first signs 
of damage to the hydric system and to the landscape were noticeable. The water was ex-
tremely scarce, especially in summer, and the little remaining water seeped. The ground water 
level fell, creating problems with drinking water suppliers. The main reaction came from fish-
ermen but also from private individuals and state bodies. The Fisherman's Federation pub-
lished an alarming report purporting that the catch system works had caused irreparable dam-
age to the fishing areas.  
The cantonal authorities took the situation in hand by initiating studies in partnership with the 
hydroelectric companies. Their goal was to define the minimum residual flow rates acceptable 
to the companies to avoid claims for compensation. According to the Federal Law on the Use 
of Hydroelectric Power of 22 December 1916, any infringement of use rights gave rise to the 
payment of compensation by the authorities, an outcome which the latter quite naturally 
hoped to avoid. The canton and OFIMA entered into a provisional agreement between 1969 
and 1973 and the first minimum residual flow rates became effective, without, however, any 
specific basis in law.  
Nonetheless, the fishermen persisted in alerting public opinion and in demanding higher guar-
anteed levels. The public debate continued in this way into the 1970s. The same is true at the 
political level, especially in the Grand Conseil. Council members denounced the excessive 
use of the water resources to the detriment of the local population citing the “energy barons” 
as the only beneficiaries. Public opinion became increasingly mobilised against what was 
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considered to be the squandering of resources. In 1975, having written open letters to the au-
thorities, demanding increased residual water flow rates, without success, the Fisherman's 
Federation launched a Popular Initiative.  The purpose of the Initiative was to amend canton 
legislation and to introduce a new article into the Cantonal Law on the Use of Water which 
would force the canton to guarantee sufficient minimum residual rates when it grants a con-
cession, taking into account drinking water needs first and foremost, but also fishing, the pro-
tection of the water and the natural environment (the requirements of agriculture and industry 
are also referred to in the Initiative but are not relevant to the Valmaggia). The Initiative 
passed with ease and, in December 1976, the cantonal parliament voted in favour of the new 
Article 8b. From then on it was a question of accurately defining the residual water flow rates 
to be imposed on the ground.  With OFIMA's agreement, the Council of State proposed in-
creasing the minimum residual water flow rates by 1%, without compensating the hydroelec-
tric companies. However, in October 1982, the parliament rejected this proposal and instead 
passed a statutory order setting the increased residual water flow rates at approximately 2% 
for current and future concessions (DL 1982). All concessions were then re-specified and the 
residual water flow rate modified for each catchment. 
September 1983, saw OFIMA submit a legal action in the Federal Courts demanding compen-
sation from the canton. There ensued a legal dispute which would not be resolved until the 
1990s. The issue has now been settled by a judicial agreement finalised before the Federal 
Court in June 1996. In this agreement, the canton acknowledges that the reductions imposed 
in 1982 were part of the watercourse drainage measures, which anticipated the measures pro-
vided in the Federal Law on the Protection of Water of 1991. The corresponding loss of pro-
duction for OFIMA was 2.4%, for which no compensation was provided. Nonetheless, com-
pensation will be paid for any additional drainage measures.  
The Federal Law on the Protection of Water imposed a new minimum residual water flow 
rate in the early 1990s. This new minimum is very low (minimum of 50 litres/second), but is 
compulsory for all watercourses and must be imposed when concessions are renewed. In addi-
tion, the canton can increase the level, as dictated by the interests of the time. Article 80 
specifies two different situations: generally speaking, the canton must set a new compensation 
water level, i.e. the quantity of water required to maintain sufficient residual flow after sam-
pling, applicable to all uses. Nonetheless, the canton must complete specific scientific studies 
to determine the minimum residual water flow rate in the zones judged to be of high environ-
mental value, in particular, the listed zones. These studies consist of inventorying the catch 
  
10
 
systems and producing a report on the relative weighting of the different interest groups. It 
may then demand a higher residual flow rate to ensure the protection of these conservation 
areas. This additional requirement could result in compensation for the company or compa-
nies whose use rights are restricted. Thus, it was solely up to the canton to decide on the 
drainage needs of the water courses, except where a water course crosses a listed area, of 
which there are several in the Valmaggia, defined in accordance with the Decree on the Pro-
tection of Alluvial Zones. The federal authorities monitor the cantons' activities and compile 
the inventories and drainage reports. During the 1980s, Ticino had already set up a “minimum 
residual water flow rates” working group, co-ordinated by the cantonal Department for Air 
and Water Protection. As the canton then decided that the measures undertaken at that time 
did not fully comply with the requirements of the new Federal Law on the Protection of  Wa-
ter, it undertook a reform of the working group during the 1990s. The group was re-vamped 
to include representatives from the fishery protection and nature conservation departments, as 
well as the hydrological and finance departments (energy). Ticino submitted its inventory of 
the catch systems to the OFEFP, the federal Office for the Protection of the Environment, 
Forests and the Landscape, in May 1997. The second report on the relative weighting of the 
various interest groups in the ecologically protected areas is currently being prepared. The 
study is scheduled for completion in 2002. 
Negotiations are finally taking place between the canton of Ticino and the hydroelectric com-
pany, SES, to redefine the parameters of the concession for the Avegno tapping stream. The 
initial attempt to reach agreement encountered opposition from the WWF and the Fisherman's 
Federation which are demanding accurate calculations of the minimum residual water flow 
rates. 
The change at the level of the water basin consists of the following developments. A change 
in design policy, as a result of the Fisherman's Federation's Popular Initiative, introduced the 
quantitative protection of the water resources at cantonal level in advance of other legislation. 
This phenomenon resulted a few years later in restricting the hydroelectric companies' use 
rights, in favour of the other functions of the water, i.e. landscape, natural habitat and fishing.  
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The table below summarises the course of the changes in the policy design and regulatory 
system. 
 Policy design Regulatory system 
1975 Introduction of Art. 8 b into the Cantonal Law on the 
Use of Water, following a Popular Initiative: from 
this point forward the canton was obliged to 
guarantee that sufficient residual flow levels are 
maintained 
 
1982 Statutory order applying minimum residual water 
flow rates to be imposed on the ground for each catch 
system (DL 1982). 
Modified all concessions in 
Ticino, including those in the 
Valmaggia, and restricted the 
hydroelectric companies' use 
rights. 
1991 Federal Law on the Protection of Water : Imposed 
minimum residual water flow rates at federal level. 
These may be more restrictive in listed areas, hence 
the strong probability of further reductions in use 
rights for hydroelectric companies in the future, when 
concession licences are renewed. 
 
1992 Decree on the Protection of Alluvial Zones: Several 
zones in the Valmaggia were listed as being of high 
ecological value. Additional measures should be 
taken to conserve them. 
 
2000  First concession renewal in 
Valmaggia since the 
introduction of the Federal 
Law on the Protection of 
Water. The WWF and the 
Fisherman's Federation 
opposed the renewal and 
demanded higher  minimum 
residual water flow rates than 
the values calculated by the 
canton. 
 
3.2 ASSESSMENT OF REGIME CHANGE  
It now remains to assess these changes according to the five dimensions of governance and 
co-ordination between the regulatory system and policy design. 
 
  
12
 
Dimension 1: Administrative co-ordination for the water basin. To what extent does the 
regulatory system and policy design take into account the resource at the level of the 
water basin? 
In Switzerland, there is no water management structure at the level of the water basins, either 
as regards ownership rights or as regards local policies. As we have already seen, decisions 
that are of vital importance to the water basin in question are taken at the level of the canton, 
the owner of the water and the body with responsibility for implementing federal legislation.  
Decisions are made without the involvement of any representatives from the valley itself. Fur-
thermore, there is no federal involvement in important decisions concerning changes, which 
are truly centred on the canton. Therefore, we could say that efforts to incorporate and resolve 
rivalries associated with hydroelectric production take the use function and the problems aris-
ing from it as their starting point, rather than the water basin.  Nor do such efforts focus on 
any form of vertical co-ordination that would link the water basin, the canton and the state. 
An example of this type of use-centred management is the creation at cantonal level of a 
multi-disciplinary working group on minimum residual water flow rates. The problem of the 
impact of hydropower affects all of Ticino. The authorities have, therefore, concentrated on 
this particular use within the canton, an area that includes several water basins. However, fol-
lowing developments in the regime, it is possible to detect increasingly sustained attention to 
the notion of water basin, especially in terms of policy design,  inasmuch as there is a realisa-
tion that samplings upstream have a negative impact on the entire course of the water, in par-
ticular on the listed alluvial zones located downstream. Thus, there is an increasing tendency 
for the cantonal authorities to consider the resource as a geographic whole, as a coherent hy-
dric system and, therefore, as a water basin, even given the absence of an administrative struc-
ture for each basin. 
 
Dimension 2: Involvement of all interested actors. To what extent does co-operation 
exist between the actors involved in public policy and the users of the resource?  To 
what extent do private actors have a stated position and the ownership rights to back up 
this position? 
In this particular sub-case, we consider the level of co-operation between the various actors 
involved to be high, at least at the beginning of the change process. In fact, the hydroelectric 
companies have continually maintained an often fruitful co-operative relationship with the 
cantonal authorities, especially in the early 1970s. During this period several tests to define 
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satisfactory minimum residual water flow rates were carried out informally, outside of any 
compulsory legislative framework. However, the 1980s marked a hardening of relations, 
when OFIMA challenged the minimum residual water flow rates imposed by the canton in its 
Statutory Order of 1982. It must be said that these companies are in a fairly advantageous 
situation in terms of defending their use rights given that the law does theoretically guarantee 
them compensation if  these rights were to be limited. The other non-state actors involved in 
this sub-case are the fishermen, whose federation is both well-organised and respected in the 
canton. Before the change, they did not have any formal use rights with which to defend their 
position, but they used the resources of the Swiss political system through the Popular Initia-
tive. They would then be consulted on a regular basis by the canton as users of the resource. 
Finally, environmental protection associations, such as the WWF, who took up a position in 
defence of the resource as a natural habitat, became involved in the changes to the regime 
through the right to appeal granted to it in 1996 through Article 12 of the Federal Law on the 
Protection of Nature, Landscape and Cultural Heritage. In addition, these associations are 
regularly consulted by the canton as part of the decision making process. 
 
Dimension 3: Scope. To what extent do public policies incorporate all uses of the 
resource? 
Significant change is evident in terms of scope. Before the period of change, only exploitation 
of the water resource was incorporated. The concessions granted to the two hydroelectric 
companies did not include any special provisions designed to protect the resource's natural 
habitat, landscape or recreational functions (such as fishing). The concessionaire simply un-
dertook to comply with all measures in force and, as we know, at that time there was no legis-
lation in force covering the quantitative protection of the water resources. However, when we 
come to the 1980s, the restriction placed on these use rights marks a profound change in pol-
icy design towards what could be termed a “greener” approach. Rival uses were recognised 
and incorporated into the framework of various bodies of legislation, both at federal and can-
tonal level. It is not only the laws directly controlling the specific management of the water 
that are at issue, but also the changes in environment protection legislation designed to protect 
the natural resources, landscape and fishing. As regards the Valmaggia itself, the most impor-
tant change in this process of extending the scope of the regime is, of course, the adoption of 
Article 8 b of the Cantonal Law on the Use of Water, which introduced quantitative protection 
of water including additional uses, such as natural habitat, support for recreational activities, 
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such as fishing, and the safeguarding of the water's function in the landscape. Ticino already 
had legislation designed to protect the landscape on its statute books since 1940, but this leg-
islation had never been amended to cover use of the water for hydroelectric production. This 
change at cantonal level found support at federal level with the Law on the Protection of Wa-
ter of 1991, which also covered the uses referred to above and the Federal Inventory on the 
Protection of Alluvial Sites, designating several parts of the Valmaggia as areas of national 
value and protecting them as a natural habitat. Finally, following the Federal Law on Fishing 
of 21 June 1991, Ticino repealed the former fisheries law and in 1996 promulgated the Can-
tonal Law on Fisheries and the Protection of Indigenous Fish and Crayfish. A feature of all 
of these different pieces of legislation is the promotion of the natural habitat,  landscape func-
tions and recreational uses, such as fishing, at the expense of hydroelectric production. Thus, 
the scope of the regime has increased and, at the end of the change period, all of the effective 
uses of the waters of the Maggia have been incorporated into policy design, legitimising the 
restrictions on use rights for hydroelectric production in favour of  competing uses. 
 
Dimension 4: Coherence To what extent do policy measures target all users of the 
resource and, more specifically, the players of central importance for change in that they 
hold the determining ownership rights? What redistribution of use rights is evident in 
this context? 
Coherence, like scope, has also improved. Before the changes, policy design took into account 
only those who had use rights for the water. At the time, the underlying hypothesis for policy 
was to stimulate local development. The operating hypothesis was to grant concessions cover-
ing the Maggia. Other users were not taken into consideration. For example, the authorities 
had no idea of the impact of hydroelectric power production on another aspect of the local 
economy, tourism, which relied on the Maggia's landscape functions. The natural habitat was 
neglected as was the recreational use of fishing, which has a strong presence and is quite visi-
ble. Tourists, the fauna and flora, as well as the local population, including the fishermen, had 
no formal use rights and did not enter into policy considerations. During the period of maxi-
mum conflict between the various uses, coherence could be said to be non-existent. After the 
change, it is possible to observe a change in the underlying hypothesis. From the mid-1970s, 
the focus was the coexistence of the valley's main economic activity, hydroelectric produc-
tion, and the competing uses for the resource, i.e. natural habitat, functions and recreational 
uses. Thus, informal users were acknowledged and incorporated into policy. In order to re-
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spect what we could term their “informal use rights”, from now on viewed as legitimate, the 
new underlying hypothesis targets those judged to be holders of excessive formal use rights, 
i.e. the hydroelectric companies.  Limits were placed on these rights by amending the terms of 
the concessions. After the change, policy design takes all users into account and policy is now 
aimed at key actors in the regulatory system, resulting in a clear improvement in coherence 
within the regime.  This coherence developed a very low level at the heart of the use conflict 
to reach a degree of balance once all uses of the resource are considered. 
 
Dimension 5: Co-ordinating the application of the measures at the level of the water 
basin. To what extent do public policies rely on public organisations and resources for 
their implementation and to what extent do these use the regulating capabilities inherent 
in the ownership rights belonging to the regulatory system? In other words, is 
implementation from the top down or does policy facilitate a bottom-up approach by 
users themselves by granting them certain ownership rights? 
As we have seen, the very process of change itself can be traced to a bottom-up approach in 
the sense that a Popular Initiative on the part of some water users, neglected by the regime, 
was at the root of the change. Nonetheless, we can describe the implementation as top-down, 
given the role of the state and various restrictive federal laws during the 1990s. In terms of the 
regulatory system, the actual change itself, i.e. the statutory order of 1982 followed by the 
amendments to the concession licences, were passed by the canton, the owner of the resource, 
reacting to popular demand. However, the implementation of these measures is supported by 
changes to policy issued at the federal level of the regime (in particular the Federal Law on 
the Protection of Water  and the Inventory of Alluvial Sites of National Importance). From 
then on, the process takes place under the aegis of the state.  The canton is answerable to the 
state for the way in which the new legislation is implemented, including regulations on the 
minimum residual water flow rates, which at the outset were cantonal measures. However, it 
is important to recall that, in Switzerland, the consultation process involves all those affected 
by the decisions, which is effectively the case in the Valmaggia. At local level, there is broad 
participation by water users in the overall process.  They are regularly consulted and often 
participate in the various working groups set up by the administration. 
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3.3 CONTRIBUTION TO SUSTAINABILITY 
At this point, we must ask ourselves if the change to the regime has truly contributed to more 
sustainable use of the water at the level of the water basin. In the case of the Valmaggia, we 
can fairly safely assert that this is indeed the case, at least in the context of this sub-case and 
relatively speaking. The introduction of quantitative protective measures for water as part of  
policy design coupled with the restrictions placed on the hydroelectric companies' use rights 
arising from these measures have had a real impact on the ground. The descriptions of the 
condition of the Maggia before the regime change make alarming reading. Entire stretches of 
the river were totally dried up, the ground water level had dropped and the landscape was so 
changed that the local population mobilised against an activity that is nonetheless the main 
source of employment in the valley. An improvement was perceptible immediately after in-
formal minimum residual water flow rates were set in place, especially in terms of the ground 
water level. From the 1970s, we no longer hear talk of a conflict between hydroelectric pro-
duction and supplies of drinking water. Even though the minimum residual water flow rates 
have proved their effectiveness on the ground, their precise determination remains a major 
challenge. It is a question not only of defining those uses on behalf of which limits should be 
placed on hydroelectric production, but also of assessing their quantitative water require-
ments. Whereas it may be relatively easy to calculate the drinking water requirements for the 
valley, this is far from the case for other competing uses. For example, how much water does 
the Maggia need for its nature and landscape functions in the Valmaggia? How much does it 
need for fishing? How much water is needed in a given stretch to ensure it can satisfactorily 
fulfil its role as a natural habitat? These are extremely complex scientific issues (biological 
requirements) and they also have a certain subjective dimension (landscape and beauty) or 
even a political and economic dimension (promotion of tourism or recreational fishing, re-
spect for the local population's aspirations, energy policy, etc.). It is just such a “relative 
weighting of interests” with a view to sustainable resource management that the canton of 
Ticino has been attempting to achieve since the 1970s.  This aim prompted the commissioning 
of numerous reports, as well as the creation of mixed working groups representing the differ-
ent interest groups. Here we encounter the eternal difficulty inherent in what is known as sus-
tainable development, that is to say reconciling the opposing social, economic and ecological 
dimensions of the issue. At this very moment two studies are currently underway in Ticino, 
arising from the provisions of the Federal Law on the Protection of Water.  One centres on 
defining allocation criteria that will be acceptable to the hydroelectric companies but that will 
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also effectively protect the environment in the listed areas.  The subject of the second study is 
the socio-economic impact, especially on fishing, of any possible additional requirements in 
terms of minimum residual water flow rates. For our part, we can state that currently, after the 
change in the regime, fishing and tourism seem to be flourishing in the valley. Nonetheless, it 
is impossible to state accurately to what extent this is due to the implementation of  minimum 
residual water flow rates. In terms of sustainable economic development, compensation paid 
out by the federal authorities will compensate for the loss of production caused by the limits 
placed on the hydroelectric companies' use rights, as a result of implementing Article 80 of 
the Federal Law on the Protection of Water. In addition, the canton will have to confront the 
restriction on its own revenues, as any drop in hydroelectric productivity translates into a re-
duction in the license fees it receives from these companies. At present its policy is to revise 
the Cantonal Law on the Use of Water to gradually re-appropriate the use rights granted and 
to take on the management of the resource it owns. Finally, accurate data is not available to 
enable us to assess the impacts of the changes to the regime in terms of the overall ecology of 
the water basin. According to the Ticino branch of the WWF, the minimum residual water 
flow rates imposed since the 1970s have, naturally, had a beneficial effect for the fauna and 
flora. However, it considers more demanding restrictions necessary, especially in the listed 
alluvial zones. In this regard, the WWF is concerned at the slow pace of renewing concessions 
in the Valmaggia. The calculation of the flow rates is also a source of anxiety for environmen-
talists. Thus, the overall ecological effects of the regime change are relatively positive, with 
room for improvement. The Maggia is still short of water today.  
 
3.4 CONDITIONS FOR REGIME CHANGE 
The swift introduction of minimum residual water flow rates in the Valmaggia during the 
1970s, fifteen years before their incorporation into federal policy, owes much to the level of 
awareness and the commitment of the local population. The role of the Fisherman's Federa-
tion, a well-organised and motivated local organisation that is recognised by local actors, has 
played a major role in building awareness of the issues and in channelling popular discontent. 
The Ticino press also gave wide coverage to this movement. The actual change to the regime 
was made possible by the use of a very efficient element of the Swiss political system, the 
Popular Initiative, launched by the Fisherman's Federation.  This enabled the rapid amend-
ment of policy. Furthermore, we should stress the fact that change to the regime was also 
promoted by the co-operation between the hydroelectric companies and the administration 
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that marked the beginning of the period of change. As the deterioration of the resource was 
particularly visible, the problem could only be eluded with great difficulty. In addition, in all 
likelihood, the WWF played a role by commissioning a study on the ecological value of the 
Valmaggia, which contributed to showing that the region was deserving of protection (Ram-
pazzi 1993). Finally, difficulties encountered in implementing the changes, such as the legal 
dispute between the canton and OFIMA, were partly overcome by the change to policy design 
at federal level, which supported the canton's decisions. The fact that several zones in the 
Valmaggia were listed as being of national importance was also significant. The WWF's and 
Fisherman's Federation's opposition to the recent renewal of the SES concession, for which 
there were irregularities in the calculation of the minimum residual water flow rates, under-
lines the important role in the implementation of such measures of the right to appeal enjoyed 
by environmental protection associations. One last point we would stress is that OFIMA con-
cerns only the local public authorities, including the canton of Ticino, and not private share-
holders. It is likely that this fact also came down on the side of change. 
 
 
4  REGIME CHANGES: SUBCASE 2: GRAVEL AND 
GRANITE QUARRYING  
 
4.1 CHRONOLOGY  
We will concentrate on the events that affected the particularly conflict-ridden area of  Riveo-
Visletto, just downstream from the confluence of the Rovana and the Maggia. We would first 
of all specify that the pace of change affecting this sub-case was uneven in two respects. On 
the one hand, the change at policy design level was steady and slow and not concentrated in 
what we determined as the change period. It was already underway during the 1970s, espe-
cially at cantonal level, and intensified during the 1990s. On the other hand, at the level of the 
water basin, changes did not become effective until after the pre-defined change period, 
through limits placed on quarrying rights, which were not implemented until the end of the 
1990s. 
As far back as the 1980s, the Rivo-Visletto sector drew the attention of the canton of Ticino 
due to the problem of the mineral waste deposits from the granite quarries. This debris had 
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been deposited directly at the edge of the Maggia, without any authorisation whatsoever, and 
in contravention of the existing legislation in force for the protection of the riverbanks. The 
problem has only finally been tackled in the last few years as a result of several events. In 
terms of planning first of all: the districts of Someo and Cevio were revising their land alloca-
tion plans and an overall guideline plan for the entire valley is being formulated. On the other 
hand, several infrastructure projects to protect the area against flooding were planned in the 
area in places that have not been restored since the floods of 1978. These projects drew atten-
tion once again to the Riveo-Visletto area. At this point, several local actors began to worry 
about the situation. In 1997, the Someo town council requested a meeting with the Director of 
the Planning Department who commissioned a firm of engineers to conduct an in-depth sur-
vey of this sector. The report was completed in 1998 and became the reference document for 
what was recognised as a true conflict of use from that point onwards. In fact, it became evi-
dent that the problem of granite waste deposits is not the only problem in this sector. Other 
issues to contend with are gravel quarrying, which proved to be excessive, as well as the pro-
tection of listed alluvial zones. These conflicting interests are concentrated in a small area and 
are intimately interlinked. The report illustrates that this situation is not only complex but 
completely disorganised. The various activities exist in parallel marked by an absence of co-
ordination and in an atmosphere of complacency, both on the part of the local authorities and 
the companies involved.  
For quite some time, at cantonal level, policy has provided a regulatory framework for the 
conflict between gravel and granite quarrying and other uses, such as the area’s function as a 
natural habitat and its geomorphological, natural beauty and landscape functions:4. In accor-
dance with this legislation, at the beginning of our reference period, quarrying should already 
be under the control of the cantonal Department of the Environment, in compliance with the 
ground water level.  In the event of damage, the operator bears responsibility. Between 1975 
and 1991, policy design continued to evolve in this same direction, that is towards the recog-
nition and development of uses competing with quarrying, mainly by means of legislation 
enacted to protect the landscape and natural resources, and more especially through legislation 
which recognises the value of the riverbanks – often the site of the quarries – as a natural 
habitat. Finally, during the 1990s, this “greening” of policy intensified, at both federal and 
                                                 
4  The Cantonal Statutory Order regulating Quarrying in Lakes, Rivers and Streams, 1928, the Cantonal Execu-
tive Decree on the Extraction of Materials from Public Waterways, 1966, and the Regulation on the Excava-
tion and Extraction of Materials in the framework of the Protection of the Water of 1969. 
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cantonal level, with the Federal Law on the Protection of Water, which underlined the impor-
tance of geomorphological issues over mining activities, the Inventory of Alluvial Sites of Na-
tional Importance, which designates the Riveo-Visletto as a site of ecological value, and the 
federal and cantonal legislation on fishing, which protects the  natural habitat of the fish. In 
addition, the canton regulates quarrying in the framework of the Cantonal Law on Building, 
which requires a detailed planning authorisation and a plan for restoring the area for all min-
ing or quarrying activities. In short, the complete process of developing a more environment-
friendly policy should have resulted well before the 1990s in limiting the gravel quarrying 
rights granted by the canton, as well as in prohibiting the dumping of granite waste on the 
banks of the Maggia on the part of the municipalities. In reality, in the Riveo-Visletto sector, 
authorisations were granted for decades in a more or less informal fashion and without any 
related requirements. 
Aware of this gap, in 1998 the canton commissioned two surveys to assess the environmental 
impact of past and present operations. The first was a gravel quarrying plan for the Riveo-
Visletto sector (Ufficio arginatura e estrazioni 1999a), assessing the quantities that could be 
extracted based on the amounts of materials borne by the river. The second survey concen-
trated more specifically on the impact of the quarrying on the area's functions as a natural 
habitat (Ufficio arginatura e estrazioni 1999b). These two reports are implacable in their con-
clusions: the ecological situation in the area is alarming. In particular, following changes to 
the river upstream in an attempt to solve a landslide problem in the Val di Campo, the sedi-
ment inputs into the Rovana are about to drastically fall, thereby reducing the possibilities of 
sampling at its confluence. An immediate halt to gravel quarrying and a swift solution to the 
problem of granite debris deposits are inevitable. The vast majority of current authorisations, 
generally covering short periods of one year, have been suspended by the canton in the inter-
ests of the general public. It now remains to find a solution for ceasing this activity that will 
not spell economic disaster for the region. Furthermore, gravel quarrying offers only meagre 
possibilities. Following the implementation of the Decree on the Protection of Alluvial Zones, 
which is of particular interest to this area, it is no longer possible to authorise gravel quarrying 
for reasons of hydraulic safety or renaturation.  
To date, there are several solutions under negotiation.  This follows a process of consultation 
extended to all actors involved in a climate of reciprocal co-operation. The first possibility 
concerns the renaturation work planned in the framework of the application of the Decree on 
the Protection of Alluvial Zones. At this very moment, an inter-departmental group is  work-
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ing on the issue and there is consultation with the towns concerned. Another approach links 
both of the valley's quarrying activities, gravel and granite. In fact, there are two opposing 
phenomena at work in the area: on the one hand, gravel quarrying, which exceeded the de-
clared 600,000 m3 in one decade and, on the other, the production and depositing of granite 
waste, in more or less the same quantities. We noted on the one head, the lack of availability 
of gravel of fluvial origin and on the other, the increase in the deposits of material which is 
practically identical in its mineral composition, the depositing of which is problematic for 
environmental and hydraulic safety reasons. Consequently, the solution is self-evident: re-
processing and grinding of the quarry waste to make it re-usable in the place of the gravel 
quarried from the river. There is now an agreement between the gravel and granite quarry 
operators and the procedure seems to work well. Finally, the gravel-quarrying sector could be 
used in the works related to hydraulic safety. In some respects, these various projects consti-
tute a transfer of the use rights that had been granted for quarrying activities to new areas of 
use highlighted by changes in policy design, even if the same companies are involved. They 
no longer simply produce a construction material, but also recycle the granite waste, thus en-
suring the hydraulic safety of the riverbanks by clearing them of dangerous obstacles. By the 
renaturation work, they are also contributing to renewing the natural habitat and to developing 
geomorphological uses of the river by restoring the banks.  
The change in the regime may be described as follows: policy design increasingly incorpo-
rates uses that compete with quarrying.  Although it comes late for the water basin being stud-
ied, this change has led to the suspension of the use rights granted by the canton to the gravel 
quarrying companies and their re-allocation to competing uses, which have long been emerg-
ing as part of policy. The table below summarises a few important stages in the development 
of this change during the pre-defined stage, in the larger meaning of the term. We should re-
member that before the 1960s measures already existed at cantonal level to reconcile quarry-
ing to a certain extent with rival uses. 
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 Policy design Regulatory system 
1966 Federal Law on the protection of Nature, the 
Landscape and Cultural Heritage:  stressed that the 
banks should be protected as a natural habitat. 
 
1974 Cantonal regulation in application of the Statutory 
Order of 1940 on the Protection of the Natural 
Heritage and the Landscape: required protection of 
the riverbanks.  
 
1991 Federal Law on the Protection of Water: quarrying 
may not affect the ground water level and may not 
negatively influence the sector's material resources. 
 
1991a
and 
1992 
Cantonal Law on Construction and Regulations for 
its Application: requires a specific plan for 
applications for quarrying authorisations, including a 
restoration plan for the area.  
 
1992 
and 
1995 
Decree on the Protection of Alluvial Zones and Guide 
to Application: lists the Visletto-Riveo quarry area.  
Quarrying must be linked to hydraulic safety and 
renaturation. 
 
1996 Cantonal Law on Fishing and the Protection of 
Indigenous Fish and Crayfish: even when authorised, 
technical operations, including quarrying, that 
damage the fish are punishable by the payment of 
compensation. Required the fish's natural habitat to 
be protected. 
 
1999  Suspension of the majority of 
quarrying rights in the Riveo-
Visletto sector. 
2000  These use rights were 
transferred to other activities, 
associated with hydraulic 
safety, recycling of granite 
waste and renaturation. 
 
4.2 ASSESSMENT OF REGIME CHANGE  
It now remains to assess these changes according to the five dimensions of governance and 
the co-ordination between the regulatory system and policy design. 
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Dimension 1: Administrative co-ordination for the water basin. To what extent does the 
regulatory system and policy design take the resource into account at the level of the 
water basin? 
As we saw with the conflict surrounding hydroelectric power production, there is no specific 
and permanent structure at the level of the water basin to control the impacts of gravel 
quarrying in the Valmaggia.  Furthermore, there is no true vertical co-ordination between the 
water basin, the canton and the state. On the other hand, we should stress the creation of the 
inter-disciplinary working group at the inception of the transfer of use rights that took place at 
the end of the 1990s. This group does not operate on the scale of the whole basin, but does 
incorporate the conflict zone itself and the potential for several uses to co-exist there. 
Nonetheless, the process of reflection ushered in by this group highlighted the gaps in 
planning and in the definition of the ownership rights to the land in the region. This increased 
awareness would seem to give rise to a will to view the Valmaggia as a whole, at least in 
terms of land allocation. Although this process does not have a direct impact on the resource 
water, it will probably have an influence on how it is managed inasmuch as it could lead to 
the protection of certain areas along the river by the towns. Finally, it is worth remembering 
that at policy level, as with the previous sub-case, we are witnessing the emergence of the 
notion of the water basin as a whole meriting consideration above and beyond more localised 
issues. One example of this process at work is the incorporation of development work 
upstream when defining the volume of gravel that may be quarried in the Riveo-Visletto 
sector. 
 
Dimension 2: Involvement of all interested actors. To what extent does co-operation 
exist between those involved in public policy and the users of the resource? To what 
extent do private actors have a stated position and the ownership rights to back up this 
position? 
It could be said that there is a high level of  co-operation between public representatives and 
users of the resource, as witnessed by the formation of a working group with representatives 
of all the actors, including the economic sectors, the municipalities and leading figures in the 
community, as well as the various cantonal departments concerned. Other more peripheral 
players were also included in the reflection process, such as the large hydroelectric 
companies, whose use of the Maggia upstream compounds the impact of the quarrying 
activities in the alluvial zone, or specialist companies engaged in the production of reinforced 
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concrete using the gravel from the area in the process. The quarry companies, who saw their 
use rights suspended and then transferred, found themselves in a more difficult situation than 
the hydroelectric companies.  Their use rights were only guaranteed by authorisations that 
were valid in the short term.  In the event of the cancellation of their rights, no compensation 
was payable. Nonetheless, their position was strengthened later on in the framework of the 
working group whose deliberations resulted in the transfer of their use rights to other sectors. 
The chief defender of these rival areas or uses (natural habitat and landscape functions, 
geomorphological uses) within the working group was the representative of the Office de la 
protection de la nature [the Swiss Nature Conservation Office]. In addition, engineering and 
consulting firms had an important role to play through their reports highlighting the 
insufficiencies in policy design to cope with the management of these various uses. They 
supported recognising the informal use rights associated with the natural habitat and 
landscape functions, as well as geomorphological uses. 
 
Dimension 3: Scope. To what extent do public policies incorporate all uses of the 
resource? 
The regime is moving decidedly towards a progressive expansion of scope, inasmuch as 
policy incorporates uses such as natural habitat, landscape and geomorphological functions to 
the detriment of quarrying. If we limit our considerations to only the pre-defined change 
period, then what stands out is the discovery of the importance of  geomorphological uses. 
This primacy resulted in Article 44 of the Law on the Protection of Water, which confirms 
that quarrying may not take place if it has a negative impact on the balance of materials. In 
addition, it is mainly on the basis of this article and a study on the balance of materials in the 
Riveo-Visletto sector that it was possible to suspend use rights. We saw that another use 
considered as important in the valley was hydroelectric production, in the management of the 
Riveo-Visletto local conflict. At the end of this change period, policy effectively covered all 
uses and sought to achieve co-existence. 
 
Dimension 4: Coherence. To what extent do policy measures target all users of the 
resource and, more specifically, the players of central importance for change in that they 
hold the determining ownership rights?  What redistribution of use rights is evident in 
this context? 
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Before the change a very low level of coherence is evident in that policy design does not take 
the key players into account, thus the conflict on rival use rights. The policy target group then 
became the holder of determining use rights, i.e. the quarrying companies. As we have seen, 
what we are witnessing is a form of redistribution of their use rights.  If these rights are still 
granted, they must be to the benefit of the natural habitat and geomorphological functions. 
Thus, we can say that there is an increase in coherence at the end of the period of change, 
even though its impact on the regulatory system took a long time to manifest itself at water 
basin level (time lag between the change in policy design and the placing of limits on use 
rights). 
 
Dimension 5:  Co-ordinating the application of the measures at the level of the water 
basin. To what extent do public policies rely for their implementation on public 
organisations and resources and to what extent do these use the regulating capabilities 
inherent in the ownership rights belonging to the regulatory system? In other words, is 
implementation from the top down or does policy facilitate a bottom-up approach by 
users themselves by granting them certain ownership rights? 
In this second sub-case, we are witnessing a process comparable to the one we described in 
the context of the first sub-case. At the outset of the change, local players were worried (in 
this instance the municipalities, responsible for the management of the granite quarries).  
They realised that their informal manner of managing the use rights was problematic. Support 
at cantonal level was needed and this is what triggered the process of change following the 
two expert reports it commissioned. These led to the suspension of the granite quarry opera-
tors' use rights and the resolution of the problem of granite waste being dumped on the river-
banks. However, the transfer of the use rights that enabled these two problems to be linked 
and thus resolved resulted from a very localised process, i.e. the formation of a working group 
with representatives of all users concerned by the conflict. Finally, we should emphasise the 
important role played by federal legislation, not only in slowly changing policy but also in the 
implementing of policy at the level of the water basin. In all probability, the fact that the 
Riveo-Visletto zone was listed as part of the  Inventory of Alluvial Zones of National Impor-
tance played a key role in implementing policy requirements by supporting the promotion of 
other competing uses and by positing the state as the guarantor for these rival uses. The 
change process then presents as a complex process. Its origins are rooted in what could be 
described as a bottom-up approach (demand for support from the municipalities).  Change 
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was then  managed by the canton, but with the co-operation of local users in the form of a 
working group.  Finally, support came from the federal level in the form of back-up for im-
plementing the changes. 
 
4.3 CONTRIBUTION TO SUSTAINABILITY 
As actual change at the level of the water basin is a very recent phenomenon, it is very diffi-
cult to draw any conclusions regarding its contribution to the sustainable development of the 
resource. The firm of consultants responsible for the environmental impact study on the ef-
fects of the quarrying operations set several criteria. Failure to meet these criteria means the 
suspension of any new authorisations. In particular, these criteria concern the presence of cer-
tain vegetatation (pioneer vegetation), the existence of a sufficient number of arborised is-
lands and the presence of at least 2,400 – 2,800 m of water courses in a woven structure in the 
area. In addition, geomorphological uses must be guaranteed by a sufficient supply of sedi-
ment. To date, these various conditions have not been fulfilled. Moreover, it is probable that it 
will take some time to re-establish a situation of relative ecological balance. Only a large 
flood could provide a new supply of sediment in the area and redress the balance of materials 
which, to date remains a negative one. The general condition of the sector has also contributed 
to more or less restrictive management of hydroelectric production and the implementation of 
minimum residual water flow rates. Nonetheless, one could consider that the change in the 
regime with respect to quarrying, and more specifically, the limitation and transfer of the use 
rights as a consequence, can only contribute to improving the ecological balance sheet in the 
area in the medium term. The progressive application of the Decree on the Protection of Allu-
vial Zones should reinforce this process. At an economic and social level, we should stress the 
ingenuity of the solutions proposed by the inter-disciplinary working group. In fact, transfer-
ring use rights enabled the region to avoid an economic disaster, saving jobs and creating a 
new niche for local businesses. The canton is actively engaged in supporting the production of 
gravel using a large portion of the granite waste. Finally, management of the Riveo-Visletto 
area may be considered as a fairly successful attempt at achieving co-existence in a limited 
sector for a large number of rival uses, taking into account the ecological, social and eco-
nomic dimensions as required by the notion of sustainable development. 
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4.4 CONDITIONS FOR REGIME CHANGE 
Consideration of the elements that helped to bring about effective change in the Riveo-Visletto sector, elicits the 
following comments. We want to show what finally triggered change at the level of the water basin at the end of 
the 1990s while actual changes in policy design should have enabled such change well ahead of this time. 
First and foremost, we should stress the fact that the initial impulse for the resolution of use 
conflicts in the Riveo-Visletto sector originated in the implementation of public policy for the 
land regime through the planning system. When it came became apparent that gravel and 
granite quarrying was carried on outside of any area zoned for this type of activity (craft in-
dustry zone or construction zone), the municipalities requested the canton's assistance. Fur-
thermore, the problem of dumping granite waste, a highly visible issue, triggered the initial 
consultations. There consultations play a particularly important role in the change process. 
They provide the data leaving no doubt as to the gravity of the situation. They also highlight 
the environmental impact of the quarrying activities and the fact that they are totally out of 
line with policy developments, making the issue impossible to ignore. The cantonal authori-
ties were now informed and could specify the causal and operating hypotheses leading to the 
suspension the quarrying companies' use rights. The swift pace of their reaction should proba-
bly be seen in relation to the fact that these activities conflict, particularly with geomor-
phological uses, and thus compromise hydraulic safety in the sector. The risk of flooding, 
caused both by the granite deposits and the imbalance in the riverbank because of excessive 
quarrying, is a credible motive for accelerating the pace at which the problem was tackled in a 
valley where the memory of the 1978 disaster is still fresh. Regional sensitivity to risks of this 
type is also probably a key factor in the rapid pace of change in policy design at cantonal level 
as regards limiting use rights for quarrying in favour of safety factors. On the other hand, in-
creased awareness of the ecological value of the Riveo-Visletto sector took longer to achieve. 
In all likelihood, designation of the sector as an area of national importance in the Inventory of 
Alluvial Zone contributed to accelerating this process. The natural habitat gained new credibil-
ity and demanded recognition in the regime. Finally, the spirit of co-operation between those 
involved, as well as their participation in a working group, created on the canton's initiative, 
also had its place during the transfer of use rights phase.  This ensured the economic sustain-
ability of the change in the regulatory process at the water basin level. We would also stress 
that the companies in question are private, contrary to the position in the previous sub-case. 
This fact probably acted as a brake on the pace of change initially, at least until the canton 
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formed the inter-disciplinary working group which resulted in the original solution of trans-
ferring the use rights. 
 
 
5  REGIME CHANGES: SUBCASE 3: PROTECTION 
AGAINST WATER 
 
5.1 CHRONOLOGY  
We now move on to events located downstream in the main, at the estuary of the river with 
Lake Maggiore. During the 1980s, plans were drawn up for a complete reclamation project 
for the Maggia, comparable to the project completed on the Ticino river. Fortunately, due to 
the sparsity of population in Valmaggia, the project was put at the bottom of the queue. When 
this project was reviewed, the problem of minimum residual water flow rates and an aware-
ness of the environmental importance of the river took precedence and the plans were defini-
tively abandoned. The works designed to provide protection against water that we will be dis-
cussing only concern a very small part of the river, located downstream, where the dyke is 
absolutely vital because of the immediate proximity of the towns of Ascona and Locarno. 
There is a long history of flooding in the lower part of the valley, affecting the area of Lo-
carno first of all, but also reaching Ascona. The legal basis for the dykes at cantonal level 
dates as far back as 1840. This legislation requires dykes at all the rivers and streams at risk in 
the canton and the removal of all obstacles to a regular runoff. With the Federal Laws of 1871 
and 1877, the state assumed responsibility for monitoring hydraulic structures on the water 
courses and granted subsidies to the cantons for remedial structures. These subsidies were 
used to build dykes on the Maggia commencing in 1891.  The purpose of the dykes was to 
channel the river over a distance of three kilometres, from the Ascona bridge to the lake. Fol-
lowing the floods of 1924, which damaged the final 800 metres of the dyke, the central canal 
was widened from 50 to 90 metres, making the canal capable of bearing a flow rate of 4,000 
cubic metres per second. Despite the precautions, the catastrophic flood of 1978, which marks 
the start of our reference period, devastated the Locarno deltaic stretch, with an extraordinary 
flow rate of 5,000 cubic metres per second. This disastrous flood will remain etched in the 
memory of the local population and marks the beginning of the changes to the regime at the 
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level of the water basin. To prevent catastrophe on this scale, the area needed to re-design and 
re-build the protective infrastructures. 
The solution was the design of an infrastructure improvement project. We will follow the 
changes in the regulatory structure for the water basin through the development of this pro-
ject. There were two main planning stages. First of all, the project proposed the construction 
of man-made banks in the section between the confluence of the Maggia and the Melezza and 
the Solduno bridge, where there are currently only the natural river banks. The next stage in-
volved the re-construction of the existing, but very damaged. man-made banks between the 
Solduno bridge and the mouth of the Maggia.  Included in this second stage was the rebuild-
ing of the canal, designed to bear a flow rate of 5,000 cubic metres per second, and a 1.30-
metre high safety bank. Safety also dictated that all the tall trees along the river's edge be 
felled. 85%  of the very high cost of the project (CHF 21.5 million) is subsidized by the can-
ton and the state. Whereas it is true to say that nobody questioned the need for these protec-
tive structures, (protection against water seems to be a self-evident use for all in the valley), 
the project has not met with equal enthusiasm among all the local people. In fact, if policy 
design has long promoted structures to channel the rivers, especially at cantonal level (Can-
tonal Law on Consortiums of 1913, Cantonal Law on Subsidence of Dyke Structures of 1938), 
it nonetheless gradually integrates competing uses and provides a basis for safeguarding the 
natural habitat and geomorphological processes (maintaining the natural river dynamic). 1978 
saw the recognition of the need to maintain the riverbanks as a natural habitat, in both federal 
and cantonal regulations (Federal law on the Protection of Nature, the Landscape and Cul-
tural Heritage, Regulation in application of the Statutory Order of January 16, 1940 on the 
Protection of the Natural Heritage and the Landscape ). At that point, environmental organi-
sations were critical of the linearity imposed on the river and the downgrading of its banks 
caused by the very geometric stepped bank built along it, especially between the confluence 
with the Melezza and the Solduno bridge, where the natural habitat could still be conserved. A 
compromise was finally reached with the building of more natural mosaic-style banks. This 
can be interpreted as an arrangement between the informal “use rights” to the flora and fauna, 
defended by the WWF, and the need for hydraulic safety, for which the canton is responsible 
(protection use against water) and which unites all actors. According to the WWF, the “use 
rights” connected with the area as a natural habitat were not initially (or sufficiently) taken 
into account in the project. Work began on this stretch in 1979 and was completed in 1982, 
without any further objections.  
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The second section (from the Solduno bridge to the lake) was more problematic. The munici-
pality of Locarno was especially concerned about the impact of the structures on the land-
scape.  It also disputed the height of the safety bank. Furthermore, the WWF opposed felling 
the large trees and even insisted on planting more on the strips of public land bordering the 
river. It was particularly insistent on protecting the nature reserve it manages at the mouth of 
the Maggia and is of the opinion that the safety levels demanded by the project are exagger-
ated. It has requested that the safety requirements be re-assessed and that the project achieve a 
better balance between the use rights associated with protection against water and those con-
cerning the landscape and natural habitat functions. In 1985, a compromise was finally 
agreed, after seven years of discussions: the building of a canal at the stretch between the 
Solduno bridge and the mouth of the Maggia capable of containing flow rates of 5,000 cubic 
metres per second, as well as a safety bank one metre high. 
However, two years later, the owner of the Delta camp site, located on the left bank of the 
estuary and the company Terreni alla Maggia SA, owner of a hotel complex and an agricul-
tural business on the right bank, just behind the natural reserve area managed by the WWF, 
submitted objections. The two owners stated that their land was insufficiently protected 
against water and demanded measures to safeguard their property. And, in actual fact, a 
breach had appeared in the unsinkable bank on the left bank. The actors rapidly reached 
agreement on this last point and the gap was repaired in 1989. A further demand was that the 
insubmersible banks be extended on the left bank for the last 300 metres before the estuary. 
The WWF is opposed to this addition to the banks. The municipality of Locarno is divided 
between these two conflicting demands. Fortunately, in 1995, an engineer working with An-
dreotti-Pfetsch Engineers suggested the construction of banks behind the nature reserve, a 
suggestion that met with approval from both sides of the argument. Work commenced in 
March 1997 and was completed in the winter of 1998. During the winter months of the fol-
lowing year, 1999, trees were planted along the banks and the strips of public land bordering 
them, following a study conducted by Dionea SA, a firm of engineers and biologists, on the 
balance between safety and protecting the environment. The construction was completed in 
early 2000. 
The change in the regime may be described as follows: at the outset of the period of reference, 
protection against water took precedence in policy design. However, we then saw a progres-
sive incorporation of other uses in planning the development of the riverbanks with a view to 
ensuring hydraulic safety. Protection against water remains very much to the forefront, but it 
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must accommodate other uses, such as natural habitat or landscape functions. This compro-
mise is also evident at the level of the water basin, where the plans for the riverbank structures 
were initially  little inclined towards respect for the informal use rights of the flora and fauna. 
The plans gradually became more environment-focussed as environmentalists fought their 
corner, without however, obscuring uses connected with maintaining hydraulic safety. 
The table below illustrates the increasing environmental awareness of policy design and the 
compromises achieved in the regime for the water basin. It should be noted that at the begin-
ning of the period under review, several measures aimed at promoting protection against wa-
ter were already in process.  
 Policy design Regulatory system 
1966  Federal law on the protection of Nature, the 
Landscape and Cultural Heritage: recognised the 
value of the banks as a natural habitat. 
 
1974 Regulation in application of the Statutory Order of 
16 on the Protection of the Natural Heritage and 
the Landscape: Public works, therefore dykes, may 
not damage or disturb the landscape. 
 
1979-1982  Conflict followed by 
compromise between the 
informal “use rights” to the 
fauna and flora, championed 
by the WWF, and hydraulic 
safety, the canton's 
responsibility, during the 
first stage of the construction 
of dykes. 
1988-1995  Conflict between the 
landowners, defending their 
rights to enjoy the use of 
their land (guaranteed by 
protection against water) and 
the WWF, defending the 
informal “use rights” to the 
fauna and flora and their 
nature reserve. Compromise 
in 1995. 
1990 Cantonal Law on Territory Subject to Natural 
Hazards: required the planning of structures to 
provide protection against water. 
 
  
32
 
 
 Policy design Regulatory system 
1991 Federal Law on the Protection of Water: Art. 37: 
water courses may only be changed for the purpose 
of protecting people or important assets. The 
natural course of the water must be respected and 
the natural habitat functions maintained. 
 
1991 Federal Law on Fishing: technical works, 
including the dykes, subject to granting of 
authorisation from the competent canton 
department Required the fish's natural habitat to be 
protected 
 
1991 and 
1994 
Federal Law on the Development of Water 
Courses and Statutory Order on the Development 
of Water Courses: integrated measures for 
protection against water and respect for the natural 
habitat and geomorphological functions.  
 
1992 Decree on the Protection of Alluvial Zones: the 
nature reserve at the mouth of the Maggia was 
listed. The canton took over management of the 
reserve from the WWF, under the supervision of 
the state. Operations related to ensuring hydraulic 
safety  tolerated, provided renaturation measures 
are be undertaken. 
 
1996 Cantonal Law on Fishing and the Protection of 
Indigenous Fish and Crayfish: if technical 
operations, including the dykes, cause damage to 
the fish or their habitat, payment of compensation 
is required. Required protection of the aquatic 
fauna's natural habitat. 
 
 
5.2 ASSESSMENT OF REGIME CHANGE 
It now remains to assess these changes according to the five dimensions of governance and 
the co-ordination between the regulatory system and policy design. 
 
Dimension 1: Administrative co-ordination for the water basin. To what extent does the 
regulatory system and policy design take the resource into account at the level of the 
water basin? 
As in the previous two sub-cases, we cannot state that protection against water is currently 
managed at water basin level, nor can we state that there is true vertical co-ordination on this 
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issue. The project for the total reclamation of the Maggia during the 1980s could have been an 
example of this as it considered the water basin in its totality. However, this approach takes 
account of only one use at the expense of all others, and we cannot, therefore, consider it as 
progressive under any circumstances from the point of view of integration. Nonetheless, we 
should stress that the structures of actors specifically linked to the subject of the dykes exist in 
Ticino since the enactment of the Cantonal Law on Consortiums in 1913. The consortiums 
are meetings of the various local bodies involved in planning work, in particular the munici-
palities that own the land requiring protection against water. This is the case of the Consorzio 
correzione fiume Maggia [Maggia river correction consortium]. While this consortium is in-
volved in the Maggia delta project described above, it nonetheless does not incorporate the 
whole water basin. The canton is currently attempting to disband the old consortia and replace 
them with broader-based bodies. The latter could be considered as being on the scale of the 
water basins, for example, this is true for Consorzio Rovana-Maggia-Melezza, which to a cer-
tain extent corresponds to the geographical unit covered by this study. 
 
Dimension 2: Involvement of all interested actors. To what extent does co-operation 
exist between those involved in public policy and the users of the resource? To what 
extent do private actors have a stated position with the ownership rights to back up this 
position? 
In the main, the development plan for the Maggia delta concerns the canton and the 
municipalities, which are obliged to ensure the functions of protection against water are 
ensured. Other non-state actors involved fall into three main categories: the first category is 
the land owners, holding property rights to the land bordering the river that is subject to the 
risk of flooding. The position of these landowners is generally in favour of protection against 
water uses in order to defend their assets.  Thus, they oppose all attempts at compromise with 
competing uses. They have no particular difficulty defending their position in that these lands 
belong to them and policy design clearly grants them the right to hydraulic safety, and this for 
some considerable time. A second category of non-state players is the environmentalists and, 
most especially, the WWF, which is heavily involved in ensuring the ecological dimension of 
the dyke project. They defend the “use rights” to the fauna and flora associated with the 
natural habitat of the river and with particular emphasis on its banks, as well as the landscape 
uses. These use rights are increasingly highlighted in policy, providing environmentalists with 
a basis for their demands. Furthermore, the WWF has formal use rights to the nature reserve 
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located at the mouth of the Maggia. The land actually belongs to the company, Terreni alla 
Maggia.  In the 1980s, the company signed an agreement with the WWF for a 20-year period 
entrusting it with the surveillance and protection of this land. The area was listed as part of the 
Inventory of Alluvial Zones of National Importance at the beginning of the 1990s and its 
management transferred to the canton, under the supervision of the state, in order to protect its 
function as a natural habitat. Naturally, this situation supports the WWF in its demands. 
Finally, we would add the right to appeal granted to the association at the end of the 1960s.  
This right enables it to officially oppose the current dyke project. The third and final category 
of non-state players consists of the firms of experts, who generally position themselves on the 
side of a carefully thought-out compromise between protection against water and the 
landscape and natural habitat uses, especially at the end of the period of change. These firms 
have the advantage of the attention and respect of the administration, which often collaborates 
with them. 
To conclude, we are of the opinion that, while it is not possible to say that there was a true 
process of integration brought about through co-operation between the actors, it is true to say 
that non-state bodies have been enabled to participate in the project and to defend their 
positions through their use rights and ownership, as well as the possibilities offered by the 
right to appeal. 
 
Dimension 3: Scope. To what extent do public policies incorporate all uses of the 
resource? 
Before the change, it was mainly protection against water that took precedence. During the 
period of change, we witnessed a gradual incorporation into policy of other competing uses, 
such as the natural habitat or landscape functions. The same process is evident if we look at 
the implementation of the Maggia delta development project. Therefore, it is our opinion that 
scope has been expanded and that the compromises achieved on the ground incorporate all 
uses. 
 
Dimension 4: Coherence.  To what extent do policy measures target all users of the 
resource and, more specifically, the players of central importance for change in that they 
hold the determining ownership rights?  What redistribution of use rights are evident in 
this context? 
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Projects such as the total reclamation of the Maggia, commenced before the change, illustrate 
very low levels of coherence at the time in that policy design does not at all consider all users 
of the resource, thus giving rise to conflict. Changes in policy design incorporated and 
promoted the informal uses associated with the natural habitat and landscape functions.  One 
could say that public policy is consistent with this insofar as it restricted use rights connected 
with protection against water. However, it is not certain that we can truly speak of weakening 
these use rights. In fact, protection against water has never really been questioned or 
restricted. It is considered as necessary by all involved. It is more correct to describe the 
redistribution of use rights as the formulation of a compromise between rival uses, mainly 
through qualitative modifications to the dyke project, the purpose of which remains hydraulic 
safety. The construction of dykes in a mosaic structure planted with vegetation is an example 
of this. For environmental associations, these compromises are seen as the absolute minimum 
that must be defended. In the valley, protection against water remains a priority. 
 
Dimension 5: Co-ordinating the application of the measures at the level of the water 
basin. To what extent do public policies rely for their implementation on public 
organisations and resources and to what extent do these use the regulating capabilities 
inherent in the ownership rights belonging to the regulatory system? In other words, is 
implementation from the top down or does policy facilitate a bottom-up approach by 
users themselves by granting them certain ownership rights? 
There is no easy answer to this question as the champions of different uses are spread through 
all levels in this sub-case. In terms of the water basin, there are as many environmental asso-
ciations as landowners, both attacking the dyke project using their right of appeal, but with 
opposing objectives. The canton is split between its responsibility to provide protection 
against water and its progressive responsibility to protect the natural habitat and landscape. 
Whereas the state can take its share of the blame for the subsidence, which enabled the dyke 
work to proceed, it also designated the nature reserve at the mouth of the Maggia as an allu-
vial site of national importance. As regards the change itself, i.e. the incorporation and promo-
tion of the natural habitat and landscape functions in the framework of the dyke project, we 
would stress the importance of the WWF's opposition using its right of appeal. This process 
could certainly be described as bottom-up. It saw its efforts supported at the end of this period 
by federal measures (top-down), both in terms of changes in policy design and at the level of 
the water basin, the designation of the nature reserve. 
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5.3 CONTRIBUTION TO SUSTAINABILITY 
Clearly, the technical compromises achieved as a result of pressure from the WWF have im-
proved the situation from the point of view of ecologically sustainable development. Further-
more, let us recall the project for the total reclamation of the  Maggia in the 1980s, fortunately 
abandoned as a result of changes in mindset and the general process of developing a more 
environment-focussed regime. Viewed from this angle, the changes to the regime avoided a 
veritable ecological disaster. Other rivers in Ticino were not as lucky and the course of the 
Ticino River was significantly altered. The WWF considers that the Maggia Delta escaped the 
worst. Nonetheless, according to the defenders of the environment, no “corrective  measures” 
are innocuous and the condition of the banks must continue to be monitored. For our part, we 
can state that the impact of these infrastructures on the landscape is significant. However, all 
actors acknowledge that they are inevitable. Economic and social sustainability must also be 
guaranteed for the towns of Locarno and Ascona, seriously threatened by the Maggia's floods. 
A dyke project that would excessively compromise protection against water in favour of com-
peting uses could not be described as sustainable from an economic and social point of view. 
Overall, we can describe the compromise between the different interests in the area in the 
context of the change in the regime  as a contribution to sustainability. 
 
5.4 CONDITIONS FOR REGIME CHANGE 
Undoubtedly, the process of integrating rival uses to protection against water is complex in a 
region where floods have wreaked their damage and taken their toll of lives since time im-
memorial. Nonetheless, we must look to the catastrophic flood of 1978 for the origins of the 
development project that gave concrete form to the change in the regime for the water basin. 
The WWF has played a major role in implementing this change, based on the hypothesis ac-
cording to which the integration process requires voluntary action on the part of a motivated 
group of people. The process is based on policy design developments incorporating a progres-
sive increase in ecological awareness, reflecting a profound change in mindset towards recog-
nition of the value of the natural habitats. The action of environmentalists is made possible by 
two phenomena. First of all, we wish to stress the importance of their right of appeal.  This 
has been the means for them to oppose the dyke project and to champion uses neglected by 
the project, even though their incorporation is dictated by policy. On the other hand, the fact 
that the WWF successfully manages a nature reserve in the sector that falls within the scope 
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of the development project and, therefore, has recognised use rights for this reserve, in all 
probability played a positive part in making their demands heard and hence in effecting 
change. Finally, as in the other sub-cases, we noted involvement at federal level in favour of 
changes to the regime and in particular, in favour of implementing these changes at the end of 
the period. Undoubtedly, this intervention on the part of the state constitutes very effective 
support for the efforts of local people involved in the integration process. 
 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS FOR THE WATER BASIN AS A WHOLE 
In describing these three sub-cases we travelled throughout the water basin, from the catch 
systems and artificial lakes of the upper Valmaggia to the structures at the estuary with Lake 
Maggiore. We would now like to review the phenomena that recur around the three central 
variables of this research, i.e. the changes to the regime at the level of the water basin, the 
consequences of these changes for sustainability and, finally, the conditions for development. 
In terms of the change per se, the three sub-cases are consistently unanimous. At the level of 
the water basin, the changes to the system are reflected in the emergence of the primacy of 
protecting the water to the detriment both of protection against water (sub-case 3) and the use 
of the water resource (sub-cases 1 and 2). The increasing environmental focus of the regime 
we found at federal level is also evident at water basin level. This phenomenon is accompa-
nied by an increase both in scope and in coherence of policy. Before the change, we saw pol-
icy that clearly favoured exploitation of the water resource and protection against water. After 
the change, the system sought to accommodate protection of the water with a view to finding 
a means of enabling all uses to co-exist in the water basin. Coherence is shored up by the fact 
that before the reference period, only formal use rights were taken into account by policy de-
sign in both its causal and operative hypotheses. After the change, users with informal use 
rights were recognised and considered by public bodies as target groups.  The change also 
heralds an approach to deal with conflicts of use in an integrated and global manner, not only 
as regards the uses themselves (inter-use linkages but also inter-resource linkages, especially 
in relation to the land or landscape) but also in terms of the water basin as a geographical en-
tity.  
The change process itself has been a complex one, heavily influenced by the specific features 
of the Swiss political system (the Popular Initiative and right of appeal) and can be described 
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as either bottom-up or top-down. In all of the sub-cases above, we noted the key role played 
by the local users of the resource, especially at the beginning of the change process (initial 
impulse as bottom-up). This trend towards change was then affirmed and its implementation 
supported at federal level in a top-down approach at the completion of the change process. 
However, the unique consultation mechanisms in the Swiss political system ensure that users 
are involved throughout the process.  
In terms of its impact on sustainable development, the change has resulted in improvement 
overall for the water basin. Evident in all three sub-cases is a consistent attempt to reconcile 
the ecological, economic and social dimensions of sustainable development. This said, en-
hancement of the environmental dimension is slow and complex. In addition, this dimension 
presents the most difficulty in implementing change, whereas economic measures do not pose 
the same challenges, a fact that highlights the importance of environmentalists' right of ap-
peal. The slow pace and fragile nature of improvements to ecological sustainability thus re-
main a source of anxiety in the Valmaggia, although overall the changes to the regime are 
favourable to sustainable development in the region. 
There are similarities across the three sub-cases in terms of conditions favourable to fostering 
change. These conditions include: 
• Visibility and evidence of conflicts of use and their negative consequences, especially in 
terms of hydraulic safety (an important driving force for change in the valley as a result of 
the traumas of 1978), but also in terms of the natural habitat. 
• Existence of relevant scientific information, for example, in the form of expert reports. 
• Effective dissemination of information to those involved, especially through the local 
press, which mobilised public opinion 
• Involvement of motivated people at water basin level and, in particular, organised bodies 
with legitimate use rights. 
• Spirit of co-operation between the actors and the incorporation of non-state and other us-
ers involved in the conflict in appropriate structures, for example in representative work-
ing groups. 
• Existence and use of several resources in the Swiss political system, particularly direct 
democracy and the right to appeal enjoyed by NGOs. 
  
39
 
• Parallel developments in the regimes for other resources, such as the land or the natural 
heritage where we also witness the development of a more environmentally friendly policy 
followed by the implementation of change. 
• Support at federal level for the implementation of change. 
Without question, the simultaneity of  these diverse variables coupled with a profound change 
in attitude in favour of protecting the environment enabled changes in the institutional regime 
governing water towards wider integration at water basin level. 
We would make one final comment: despite very clear change towards more integrated re-
source management, we must state that there is no mechanism focussed on water basin level 
itself, either in the Valmaggia or elsewhere in Switzerland. One possible explanation is con-
nected to the regulatory system – in Switzerland, there is no common property. The structure 
of ownership at water basin level is excessively complex.  The water itself belongs to the can-
ton while the banks are generally divided into various lots and owned privately, by the mu-
nicipalities or the canton. In all likelihood, this very fragmented structure plays against inte-
grated resource management specifically in terms of the water basin, even if we do see signs 
of integration at all other levels. 
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